PILOT INNOVATION FUND FOR CLEAN COOKING ENTERPRISES: SYNTHESIS OF LESSONS LEARNED

OBJECTIVE

Strengthen supply of clean cookstoves and fuels by providing grant capital to finance game-changing technology and business model innovations in the clean cookstoves and fuels sector.

Context

The Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (Alliance) is a public-private partnership with a mission to save lives, improve livelihoods, empower women, and protect the environment by creating a thriving global market for clean cookstoves and fuels, with a goal of enabling 100 million households to adopt clean and efficient cooking technologies by 2020.

Based on the input of over 350 leading experts and practitioners from across the globe, the Alliance has identified a market-based approach as the most sustainable way to achieve universal adoption of clean cooking solutions in *Igniting Change: A Strategy for Universal Adoption of Clean Cookstoves and Fuels*. Coordinated and published by the Alliance, the report outlines a three-pronged strategy for creating a strong market for clean cooking solutions including:

- *Enhance demand* by understanding and motivating potential users, developing cleaner and more efficient technologies, and providing consumer finance;
- *Strengthen supply* by attracting more finance and investment, helping enterprises to access carbon finance, enhancing market intelligence; and creating inclusive value-chains and innovative distribution models to reach remote consumers;
- *Foster an enabling environment* by engaging national and local stakeholders, building the evidence base for the benefits of clean cookstoves and fuels, promoting international standards and rigorous testing protocols; and enhancing monitoring and evaluation.
Increasing investment is one of the six value propositions identified in the Alliance’s ten-year strategic business plan. Funding and financing tools need to target clean cookstoves and fuels enterprises at different stages of development. Financing needs and challenges will also vary along the industry supply chain. The diagram shows the financial products the Alliance has designed to enable enterprises at different stages of development to grow and leverage further investment.

**Challenge**

While decades of cookstove implementation experience and hundreds of organizations active in the sector and are a strong foundation to build on, the clean cookstove and fuel market was immature and highly fragmented. Innovations were needed across the value chain – from product design to technology improvement to consumer finance. However, few government and philanthropic funders take risks on unproven innovations and investors do not often fund research and development without a readymade market for the innovation. Grant investments were needed to develop better technologies and business models appropriate to the local context and improve the fragmented value chains in many markets. These types of grant investments help move the sector forward through supporting proof of concept for potentially game changing ideas and sharing lessons learned from both successful and failed innovations.

**Solution**

In 2012, the Alliance released the Pilot Innovation Fund (PIF) to finance the proof of concept of innovative approaches along the value chain in order to strengthen supply and enhance demand for clean cookstoves and fuels. In return for seed capital to finance and pilot these innovations, recipients are required to document lessons learned and share results to advance awareness of scalable solutions in the sector. Pilot grants can be awarded to enterprises at any stage of development. Successful pilot projects can go on to apply for Spark grants to scale their innovative solutions.

**Overview of Pilot Innovation Fund Winners**

**Round 1**

**UpEnergy** works with technology manufacturers and local distributors to deliver high quality energy-efficient cookstoves to the energy poor at affordable prices. UpEnergy specializes in creating effective carbon-financed distribution channels that deliver life-altering technologies to the developing world. In just over one year, UpEnergy has distributed over 20,000 stoves in Uganda, making them the largest distributor of firewood cookstoves in the country. UpEnergy used their Pilot funds to test distribution through Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCos). Specifically, funds were used to provide financing through the SACCos to the end consumer, who can purchase a clean, efficient stove over a series of payments.

**Potential Energy** has distributed over 18,000 stoves via humanitarian efforts in Darfur since 2003. They used Pilot funds to convert their successful distribution model into a social enterprise, selling the stoves at an affordable price using consumer financing. During their recent transition to a market-based distribution approach, Potential Energy determined unfulfilled demand and willingness to pay for
stoves if consumers could pay over time. Potential Energy’s revolving loan fund addressed this need head-on, allowing distributors to provide financing to consumers.

**Greenway Grameen Infra (GGI)** is a manufacturer and distributor of stoves in India. They used their Pilot funds to develop an above the line marketing campaign to complement their current marketing strategy. Over the course of the year, GGI added 80 dealers to their network as a direct result of the marketing campaign. The marketing strategy targeted retail distribution partners, developing brand recognition and educating consumers about the benefits of the stove.

**Solar Sister** is an award winning social enterprise that leverages an innovative gender inclusive and market based business model to empower African women as engines of a clean energy revolution. They combine the breakthrough potential of clean energy technologies with a women-driven direct sales network to bring lighting and energy products to off-grid communities in Africa. Solar Sister used Pilot funds to add cookstoves to their current product basket, offering customers a unique “home economics” solution through a range of modern lighting, phone charging, and improved cooking choices in Nigeria. Specifically, the funds help to purchase cookstoves for distribution and training of women microentrepreneurs in Nigeria.

**Sustainable Green Fuel Enterprise (SGFE)** is a manufacturer and distributor of char briquettes in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. They used the Pilot grant to test a hub and spoke distribution model for the distribution and franchising of char-briquettes in Cambodia. Specifically, funds were used to create a distribution center in Sihanoukville, as well as a more accessible distribution center in Phnom Penh. SGFE also improved production processes to match increased distribution. SGFE created new entrepreneurs with their revised distribution model and increased access to char briquettes in Cambodia.

**Improved Cook Stoves for East Africa Ltd (ICSEA)** is a fair trade carbon scheme that holds a regional Programme of Activities (PoA) for Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi under the CDM Gold Standard certification scheme for carbon credits, the first of its kind. In order to manage the large number of component project activities (CPA) registered under the PoA umbrella, ICSEA used Pilot funds to create a robust platform that can be adapted and scaled up as the ICSEA PoA grows. Specifically, the funds helped ICSEA develop a unique database that fits the regional carbon monitoring needs of ICSEA under the Gold Standard.

**Round 2**

**Applied Sunshine LLC** is a startup company that has developed an innovative vacuum tube solar cooker. The PIF funds were used to adapt their product design and conduct field testing in Guatemala. This tube structure has the capability of cooking various types of foods that other solar cooking models cannot, including local foods such as tortillas.

**Prakti Design** completed a two-burner, multi-fuel stove design for Bangladesh. This stove was developed in response to the increasing demand from consumers for multiple burner stoves. Prakti aimed to quickly achieve economies of scale through sales to more markets due to the stove’s fuel versatility.

**Emerging Cooking Solutions (ECS)** manufactures and distributes pellets in Zambia. ECS currently sells the Phillips stove at US$ 100 as the preferred option to burn their fuel. ECS tested the Prime stove (US$ 35) with their pellets and tested a financing model based on working with employers.
Rahimafrooz Renewable Energy Ltd (RRE) is a solar home product distributor in Bangladesh. RRE expanded into the clean cooking market by building on a WASHplus study that was conducted in Bangladesh.

CleanStar Ventures used Pilot funds and lessons learned from their work in Mozambique to develop an ethanol stove with a refillable fuel cartridge. They also developed complementary household appliances that can use ethanol and a fuel distribution process that leverages partnerships with multinational corporations. CleanStar continues to test their innovation in Nairobi through the sale of appliances and ethanol fuel.

C-Quest Capital (CQC) is a private equity and carbon finance firm that provides clean and efficient household energy technologies and sustainable sources of household fuels. Through TLC Green, a Joint Venture between CQC and the Malawian NGO Total Land Care, CQC tested a new business model to couple the marketing and sale of sustainable firewood with improved cookstoves.

Round 3

Colorado State University tested Exhaust Gas Recirculation (EGR) and air injection add-ons to high firepower woodfuel cookstoves. The EGR units direct exhaust from the chimney back into the combustion chamber, while air injection directs external air into the stove. The add-ons also had power harvesting modules to channel surplus power to power fans and charge small devices, such as phones. This technology was developed in the United States and was market tested with a manufacturer in Kenya. The team provided a framework to evaluate the appropriateness of these add-ons with other high firepower cookstoves and in other geographies.

Ecosur Afrique aimed to revolutionize how charcoal briquettes are manufactured through the introduction of a modern biomass pyrolysis kiln - a 100-tons per month container-sized piece of equipment designed in Ukraine. The kiln is composed of dual drying/pyrolysis chambers that operate simultaneously: when the heat (biomass-based) is supplied to one chamber in pyrolysis mode, the residual heat is supplied to the other chamber (in drying mode). This project in Cote d’Ivoire experienced delays due to internal civil unrest and import challenges but as the PIF project was ending, Ecosur forged a new partnership with a local industrial manufacturer to continue to test, produce, and distribute their briquettes.

Ecozoom partnered with PATH, a global nonprofit health organization, to transform their health workers into health and energy workers. The pilot tested three different fuel distribution channels and used imported pellet fuel and static sales points. Ecozoom sold products through community volunteer networks and neighborhood deliveries in order to understand the revenue and distribution model needed to make household fuel sales viable in Western Kenya. The PIF grant also tested a customer loyalty scheme to incentivize households to continually buy pellet fuels. Distribution and sales of pellets faced significant challenges as a sustainable commercial business without significant investment; accordingly, Ecozoom opted to discontinue this element of their business.

Novogaz partnered with POET LLC, one of the world’s largest ethanol producers, to supply ethanol for cooking to low income households in Haiti. The project supplied ethanol stoves at the same price as traditional stoves, and supplied ethanol fuel at 15% below the price of charcoal. Lessons learned from this partnership are being documented and shared to help smaller social enterprises around the globe import and distribute clean burning ethanol fuel at lower volumes and price points. Novogaz is continuing to focus on the market uptake of ethanol through their Novogaz kiosks and sales ladies.

Project Gaia and CleanCook AB were also partners in this project.
Lessons Learned Related to Product Design

Design requires the entire market system local materials, import policies, and manufacturers. Applied Sunshine’s core evacuated tube technology was not going to change during the pilot project, but they did have to optimize the design to make the technology useable and affordable in the country. This required the design team to spend a large portion of their time searching for locally available materials and testing a wide variety of materials. They experienced some challenges with material availability. For example, the reflectors available on their developed market model, the GoSun Sport were not available in Guatemala. They had to find a low cost metal reflector alternative. The exoskeleton, or frame of the solar cooker was also challenging to design at a low cost with locally available materials. Locally available materials were important in this case to keep costs down. The evacuated tube was only available in China and Applied Sunshine quickly found that import tariffs and transportation costs from China to Guatemala would rule out sending large finished products to the country. However, shipping parts or focusing on other Latin America countries would be more cost effective.

In user-centered design, it’s okay to complete prototypes for a pilot as long as the long-term business model is also considered. The Applied Sunshine team spent many weeks commissioning trays in Guatemala. They found that stainless steel in Guatemala could be more expensive than the United States. After a few iterations of the technology, in order to proceed quickly with testing the design with consumers in a cost-efficient way, they created the prototypes in the US and flew to Guatemala with stoves in the team’s checked baggage. For the frame of the prototype stove, the team tested 10 different materials e.g. plywood, waterproofed cardboard, high density poly ethylene, rebar, piping, and conduits. The team kept their mind open to all types of materials and all styles of cooking. In one cases, the users came up with the best materials solution- a tube cap (to close the oven) made of corn husks. They found that this retained heat well and was low cost. The corn husks are not part of the final prototype, but they did encourage designers to continue to think about alternative materials.

Language and cultural barriers can inhibit design and are not always overcome by a local partner or local hire. Applied Sunshine started recruiting project partners before the designer arrived in Guatemala. As a result, the local staff and partners were not as well versed in the goals of design thinking when they began to recruit other partners and pilot participants. The lead designer was also not well versed in the local language and dynamics of indigenous culture ahead of the project. This inhibited the design process especially when Applied Sunshine’s designers were soliciting feedback and working with users on the prototypes. Stove testers would only provide positive feedback instead of constructive criticism. The designers were unsure if this was caused by a desire from the translators/local partners to demonstrate that the product was a success or if it was not culturally appropriate to provide criticisms of a product to the designer. Ideally, this problem would be mitigated by hiring a local engineer well versed in design theory, but this type of talent is difficult to find in many markets. In the future, the Applied Sunshine would spend time educating local staff design theory before they begin design activities.

Lessons Learned Related to the Team

It is important to be strategic when recruiting the first employees in a country. Like other stove manufacturers, Applied Sunshine wanted to scale their operations as efficiently as possible. This meant playing the role of manufacturer and avoiding taking on additional roles in the value chain. They did this by hiring a key individual in Guatemala who was responsible for the recruitment of local partners. The local hire brought on partners for the pilot, but the management’s perspective on strategic partners and go-to market strategies was limited to the information provided by this individual. The local hire was
connected with NGOs in the region, knew the culture and the language, but did not have a business background. As a result, Applied Sunshine has implemented plans to conduct a talent search for a market. They believed the benefits of having the right individual to kick off operations outweighed the time and money it takes to recruit that person.

Lessons Learned Related to Market Dynamics

Market dynamics matter. Guatemala has a strong history of stove giveaway programs from municipalities and NGOs, which made it difficult for enterprises to sell stoves to end users. Applied Sunshine could not scale up distribution of their solar technology in the country and maintain a sustainable business model that would scale the market with giveaways and instead focused on testing the product in a way that assessed the consumer’s desire to purchase the technology. They found that their product was unique and aspirational enough to differentiate itself from the giveaway stove programs with consumers. However, manufacturers and distributors were not prepared to take on the risk of making and marking a product that was historically given away, which resulted in making commercialization impossible at the end of the pilot. Applied Sunshine has since been working to find the appropriate partner in the country and exploring other markets.

Lessons Learned Related to Product Marketing

Community Health Volunteers are a good access point into a community and to introduce new products and ideas. As members of the community themselves they understand well the needs and local dynamics and represent a trusted person who has easy access to households. In one pilot conducted by EcoZoom, 80% of users were either CHVs or referred by a CHV. However, CHVs engaged in many different activities and had competing priorities. This limited the availability and frequency in which they could engage in promotion. A key lesson learned was that providing incentives to users to engage in product promotion can increase promotion efforts, but any incentives provided must be offset against the increase in uptake they produce.

Not everyone is an early adopter and wants to try new technology. Many people wanted to see a product working first before they made a decision to buy it, which limited the initial uptake of any new innovations. As such, it has taken time for new products to gain traction within a community and this should be accounted for in future pilots.

The referral system was an effective way to get early users of the technology although the uptake of the product remained slow (potentially due to other factors as described here). In addition, the users who signed up through referrals were geographically scattered, and building up a high density of households around a single, central sales point proved challenging.

Having energy champions within the community is an effective way to promote a new product and gain new users. Out of 41 referrals, 19 came from just two individuals (46%). These energy champions often engaged in promotion, not for financial rewards, but because they believed in the product and had a sense of shared commitment in bringing benefits to the community. Identifying and supporting these champions for the products was important, and they further developed to take on formal roles as the business scaled up. When using community volunteers or champions to promote a product or idea, it is important to ensure they are communicating the right messages. This requires providing them with the right support, training and materials to do this.

New customers need the ability to sign up and access products at their convenience and when they have the money available. They often needed time to consider an investment in a product after initially seeing it advertised. Target consumers had competing priorities for their limited income, and if
they were unable to access the products when they were ready, their funds were often diverted to other pressing needs.

**It is important to have adequate vetting of users of the technology** when making a financial investment in targeted customers and when expecting a return through fuel usage. It is also important to learn through early users which types of customers generate the highest usage rates and refine subsequent marketing approach to target them.

**Whilst approaches for marketing and sign up had an effect on how quickly organizations and enterprises were able to get new users to sign up, finding the right type of people was just as important.** Where customers were open to new innovations, had more disposable income, and enthusiasm for environmental issues, uptake appeared to be quicker.

**Detail matters in the marketing message.** Greenway learned that each detail of the visual message was important to brand recognition. They worked with marketing experts to determine details. For example, they found that promoting the stove with young couples in traditional wedding dress signaled that the stove should be a part of a new couple’s house. The stove’s association with weddings also signaled aspiration. Furthermore, materials were translated into the local dialects of the regions and with different cultural attributes helped them reach new markets. Even the product’s packaging was changed for a more aspirational appeal. A set of focused group discussions conducted with users revealed that one of the major reasons why stoves were not considered at par aspirationally with other household appliances was the packaging. The new packaging amended this and has been popular with both customers and retailers. Creating new marketing collateral was a longer process than expected but has enhanced brand development immensely. Though Greenway still had to conduct product demonstrations to educate users on the product and ensure customer satisfaction, they discovered that branding and advertisement activities created awareness of cookstoves as a product category and comfort among potential customers that they were buying from a professional company.

**Invest in a professional firm and experience team where possible.** Cash-strapped organizations often keep marketing budgets low and hire minimal marketing staff. Greenway, for example, was able to hire a marketing manager as a result of this pilot program. The capability of the manager is also tremendously important. Greenway also learned that tracking results at tertiary (consumer sales) level is difficult but that they must invest in organized reporting systems to track sales at individual retail-level. When tracking results at secondary (retailer orders) level, Greenway learned that retailers were greatly affected, and even the promise of a newspaper ad prompted more inventory purchases.

**Tracking results of above the line marketing is challenging.** Greenway noticed an increase in overall sales and retail channel sales, but they had no real insight on the role their advertisements played in driving the channel sale. The adverts directed customers to a retailer, and it was difficult to follow up with each retailer on how many customers had mentioned the ad. Greenway ended up conducting separate brand awareness surveys during the course of their grant in order to understand the true customer perception and brand awareness.

**Lessons Learned Related to Distribution Models**

Customers appeared to value convenience and reliability when giving feedback on the different deliver models. Knowing that the pellets were always there if they needed them was important. Convenience also meant different things to different people. For example, it could have meant having the fuel delivered, having a sales point that could be accessed at any time or having an easy payment method. Results from this pilot showed that having a fixed sales point seemed to be the most preferred method for customers to access their pellets. Additionally, the fixed sales point could take different
forms such as a local shop, health facility, or home of a neighbor. Fixed sales points also had the lowest cost of last mile distribution to one grantee, EcoZoom (around 3.6 KES/ kg), which could then be further reduced at scale where larger volumes could be delivered and more favorable rates negotiated.

**Getting the right person as your reseller is important.** Ideally the individual should be committed to the project and can also act as a champion in the community and point of information on the product. However in one pilot the grantee only tried one person with each model, so it is difficult to draw strong conclusions when comparing each one. There was not a significant difference between the way a CHV and non-CHV reseller operated, but what was important was that the reseller was well-connected and accepted in the community.

**Ideally customers want to access a sales point that is close to their home.** However, in reality a critical number of customers were needed to support a sales point to make a decent profit for each reseller. Hence whilst customer numbers were low, it was found that not all people could still be located close to the sales point.

**Whilst the delivery model can prove convenient for people who live far from the sales point it is expensive to operate and can only be cost effective when higher sales volumes are achieved.** Having delivery as a backup was useful to cover issues of unavailability at retail points. However, it was learned that delivery should be prioritized for larger bag sizes or run in a structured manner as to target several customers in each trip.

**Current profit margins available to resellers from the sales of Pika Poa are low compared to other household items.** To maintain an effective network of resellers and attract further resellers their profit margin had to increase. This had to come either from an increase in the sales price of the fuel or an increase in customers since the profit margin available to the grantee (EcoZoom) was already small. However, it was learned that increase in sales price was still likely to have an effect on uptake.

**Our data shows that customers prefer a range of bag sizes.** The 2kg bag was most popular amongst users since it allowed them to access the fuel at a lower price point. However, those customers that favored the larger bag sizes tended to be more active users of the fuel. The delivery model seemed to have little effect on the purchased bag size; it was more dependent on the availability of money and usage rates.

**We cannot conclude any clear trends linking average customer usage to the different distribution models from the current data we have from the pilot.** The pilot data is limited due to the relatively short time period and the limited number of consistent and active customers. However, it showed that the majority of customers were low users, and average usage rates of around 0.3 kg per day were what could be expected from active customers. This was much lower than expected and had a significant impact on the viability of fuel sales to households.

**In some settings, if enterprises are to scale the distribution network moving forward they should concentrate on building up a network of static resellers, locating them as close as possible to the highest density of customers.** These resellers should be well recognized in the community and should also act as points of information on the stove and fuel products (potentially doubling as agents for signed up new households as well). However, enterprises must consider increasing the incentives to resellers since profit margins were low, which threatened the financial sustainability of the business. In more rural locations or where logistical challenges existed this should be supplemented with a delivery model. This delivery model would be most effective to deliver to customers organized in a group setting and having a weekly delivery data that would allow customers to order and pay together.
The best distributors are strong entrepreneurs. As some distribution partnerships fell through, one grantee learned that the best distributors were those with strong entrepreneurial traits. Entrepreneurs with access to storage space and a means of transportation were also more successful distributors.

Transferring transportation costs to buyers is beneficial. One initial proposal had envisioned the purchase of a truck and tuk tuk but the grantee found that transferring transportation costs to buyers was more beneficial. Individuals or centers that owned a means of transportation served as good distributors. Further, due to the reduced costs of transportation in urban areas, city-based distributors proved to be better distribution agents.

Price differentiation drives sales. During the PIF period, one grantee introduced three price levels based on the tonnage size of the purchase. The lowest prices were offered to those who bought directly from the SGFE factory. Individuals who bought less than ten 30-kilogram bags paid the highest price. This price differentiation was successful in driving sales of char-briquettes.

High density of points of sales actually increases demand. The SGFE proposal expressed fears that a saturated market near its factory would reduce sales in those areas. A majority of the points of sales (POS) for the grantee’s char-briquettes fell within a radius of 5-6 kilometers of the factory. Sales and distribution during the PIF period revealed that those high POS density areas in fact displayed growing demand and were far from being saturated.

Providing samples is an effective marketing strategy. SGFE had initially outlined expenditure on promotional material such as T-shirts, flyers, billboards, umbrellas and radio advertising. However, in the course of the grant period the grantee found that providing samples of char-briquettes was one of the most effective ways to drive sales. The sample size, which started off as a 5 to 10 kilogram bag, was changed to a 30-kilogram bag and lasted a night or even several nights depending on the amount of usage. In order to set off any expectation of continued giveaways, SGFE was emphatic about the samples being a one-time exchange.

Lessons Learned Related to Production

Stabilizing Stock: During the PIF period, SGFE prioritized efforts to stabilize stocks and focus on push rather than pull factors to assess production levels. With the help of two intern engineers, SGFE streamlined its production flow and stock management processes to ensure that stocks were maintained between 50 to 100 percent of the monthly sales demand. Inventory and stock management was applied to both the final product and raw materials. This was a major breakthrough since SGFE did not previously collect stock information nor did they use it to inform production decisions.

Leverage Negotiating Power: Since SGFE doubled its production; it has leveraged its position to negotiate better prices with its raw material suppliers. SGFE has been able to be selective about the suppliers it chooses based on best prices. SGFE conducts random raw material sample inspections to ensure that quality standards are maintained. With the rising production levels, SGFE has been successful in reducing the cost price of inputs.

Trial and Error: Carlo Figa of SFGE is ebullient when he describes the organization’s success in locally building a dryer that has reduced drying time from 29 to 24 hours. The locally adapted dryer was a result of a trial and error method and SGFE learned valuable lessons from its compounded experience over the years. Building on the PIF experience, SGFE went on to significantly reduce drying time to 10 hours with the Spark Fund. Another example of this is the enhanced extruder that SGFE currently uses. Over the years, SGFE has learned that fortifying the extruder coil with extra metal and daily cleaning of the equipment adds momentously to its life.
Production Targets and Incentives: SGFE introduced an incentive system of employee bonuses to motivate the SGFE team to achieve the big production targets outlined during the PIF grant period. Employees get a bonus when a production target is achieved; this incentive system continues to motivate and uphold employee morale and satisfaction.

Annexes – Case Studies

1. Applied Sunshine
2. Ecozoom
3. Greenway Appliances
4. Sustainable Green Fuel Enterprise
Applied Sunshine: Lessons learned in Adapting Solar Stoves

Organization Profile

Year Established: 2011

Countries of operation: USA, Guatemala

Headquarters: USA

Organization type: Solar stove manufacturer


Grant: Pilot Innovation Fund Round II, 2014

Organization Overview

After years of research and development, Applied Sunshine kick-started the sales of their evacuated tube solar cooker through a successful crowd-funding campaign in 2013. GoSun has become the leading name in fuel-free cooking, having delivered thousands of stoves in more than 45 countries. Its quickly growing team shares a strong commitment to the solar-fueled lifestyle and the serving of others with their work.

Grant Objective

Applied Sunshine had already successfully developed and piloted their GoSun Sport solar stove in the developed market. However, the team believed that the product could have an impact on the billions of people around the world who primarily cooked on solid fuels. They decided to test their stove in Guatemala, after testing the product with traditional foods like tortillas and making a contact there that would help them develop in roads in the market. Their project plan was primarily to conduct user centered research and development and complete a new version of their solar stove product for the Guatemalan market. The pilot in Guatemala would also allow them to conducting business development activities, laying the foundations for commercialization of their product in Guatemala and other emerging markets.

Their user centered design process included an in depth customer survey and iterations on the design of the product.

- Designing the product to fit User Needs
- Validating Design Directions via field activities
- Developing a Deeper Understanding of the customer and their relationship to the product

Note: This documents focuses on the grant overall and lessons learned in design as well as product commercialization. An in depth presentation on the findings from the user surveys and Applied Sunshine’s design process can be found on the Alliance’s website alongside this case study.

Achievements of Grant

Applied Sunshine successfully developed their emerging market prototype product and market tested it with consumers. Dubbed the ‘Girasol’, Applied Sunshine transformed their small evacuated solar tube cooker to a large cooker able to cook and bake foods for large families.
They were able to test relevant brand names and marketing messages with consumers, settling on the brand name of the Girasol, meaning sunflower in Spanish. Finally, they were able to conduct a product buyback test with the prototypes developed. This was a small sample due to the nature and expense of prototyping, but they determined a willingness to pay of up to $92 for their product through a buyback test. The results of the test were a surprise given that Guatemalan cookstove users are accustomed to giveaways.

Applied Sunshine believes that the value of the PIF grant was not simply garnering market intelligence, but that it allowed them to better able to engage with consumers in emerging markets to understand the realities of their value proposition. In developed markets, their value proposition is providing environmentally conscious consumers with a clean alternative technology. In Guatemala, the environmental concern was secondary and they found that users were much more excited by the concept of an aspirational product and the prospect of baking foods.

Despite the successes and learnings associated with the product design, Applied Sunshine was not able to fully commercialize their solar oven in Guatemala. They found it difficult to find an entrepreneurial partner willing to import and market the technology in the country. Applied Sunshine was not ready to take on the role of importing and distribution in Guatemala when the prototype was complete. At that time, Applied Sunshine had invested a significant amount of their revenues from the developed markets to test the emerging market product and had to divert resources back to developed market sales in order to generate cash to sustain the organization. The grant had allowed them to optimize their product for Latin America and understand the market better. However, Applied Sunshine would need to wait for an additional injection of capital into the country and hire on-the-ground staff before entering the market in Guatemala or elsewhere in Latin America.
In-Depth Look: A Designer’s Story

“We had arrived in the town of La Providencia and were cooking with the host mother of one of our solar stoves. As we got things started, her sister-in-law signaled us from the edge of the yard and asked us to come and look at what she was cooking on for her family. We stepped into a smoky room made of scrap metal nailed to wood with a dirt floor and no door. On the side of the room another piece of metal was propped up with four posts, and on it is the cooking fire. Two cinder blocks are balanced on top with a grill between to cook on. The woman leaned over and blew into the fire. Ashes start flying up; the child she is holding buried her face into her mom’s shoulder to avoid breathing the smoke or getting burned. She then told us that she needed a solar oven too. We could only nod in agreement.” —Applied Sunshine intern
Innovative Distribution Models for Uptake of Sustainable Fuels

Findings from the Pilot Stage

November 2016

Laura Patel & Hesbon Nyangena
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INNOVATIVE DISTRIBUTION MODELS FOR UPTAKE OF SUSTAINABLE FUELS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINDINGS FROM THE PILOT STAGE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOVEMBER 2016</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAURA PATEL &amp; HESBON NYANGENA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. FACTORS EFFECTING UPTAKE</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 2.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMUNITY UNIT APPROACH</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 INITIAL PRODUCT MARKETING</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 ADDITIONAL APPROACHES</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 LESSONS LEARNT FOR PRODUCT UPTAKE</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 CUSTOMER LOYALTY PROGRAM</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 PRODUCT PACKAGING</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 COST EFFECTIVENESS</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8 STOVE REPAYMENT RATES</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9 PRODUCT IMPACTS</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTION MODELS</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 OVERVIEW OF DELIVERY MODELS</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL VIABILITY OF EACH MODEL</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 INFLUENCE OF MODELS ON USAGE RATES</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 INFLUENCE OF CUSTOMER DEMOGRAPHICS ON USAGE RATES</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction

Since July 2014, EcoZoom has been studying the market for pellet fuel in Kenya. We began this process in 2014 through a feasibility study looking at user responses to the gasifier stoves needed to cook with the pellet fuel. This was accompanied by a feasibility study on the availability of raw materials for pellet fuel production.

In May 2015, we were awarded a grant from The Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves under their Pilot Innovation Fund (PIF). This grant allowed us to embark on a commercial pilot selling pellet fuel to households through 3 different distribution models. The aim of the pilot is to test innovative distribution and customer incentive schemes to increase the uptake of pellet stoves and fuels within households in Western Kenya. The pilot has tested three different fuel distribution channels using imported pellet fuel, static sales points, selling through community volunteer networks and neighbourhood deliveries to understand the revenue and distribution model needed to make household fuel sales viable. The PIF grant has also tested a customer loyalty scheme which has incentivised households to continually buy pellet fuels and allow more accurate tracking of fuel sales.

For the pilot, household were able to access a micro-gasifier stove sold by Philips, through a lease to own model. These are forced draft stoves capable of significantly reducing exposure to indoor emissions and reaching Tier 3 on indoor emissions under the IWA TC 285 performance tiers. This stove retails in Kenya at around 13,000 KES (128 USD), a price prohibitive for the majority of the targeted end users. In our lease model, households were able to make a down payment of 1,000 KES (9.8 USD) after which they were given the stove to start using. The households made subsequent quarterly payments of 1,000 KES for 12 months after which they had a chance to own the stove by making a final payment of 1,000 KES. The total amount that the household were to pay by the end of the lease period was 5,000 KES (49.5 USD).

Alongside these sales to households EcoZoom has continued to conduct market research into larger institutional and commercial customers with support from Gatsby Charitable Trust and ENEA consulting. Most notably we were able to build a business model for the
establishment of a pellet production facility in Kenya with support from ENEA consulting in July 2014. These initial pilots and feasibility work have been completed to allow EcoZoom to decide whether to establish a pellet production facility in Kenya and the associated business models that would be needed.

This report presents the main finds from the commercial pilots with households in Western Kenya and shares lessons learnt on the initial uptake of the fuel and its reception in the market. It then goes on to assess the different distribution model tested, their influence on uptake and cost effectiveness. The report concludes by reviewing the larger business model for pellet production using what we have learnt from our pilots to determine the overall viability of pellet distribution as a business venture for EcoZoom.

The first sales of the branded “Pika Poa” pellets were made to households at the end of September 2015. This report uses data from these first sales up to the end of June 2016, approximately a nine-month period. Data was collected from customers through in person surveys which were conducted with 49 households across the three distribution model during May and June 2016. In addition we utilise sales information from our tracking systems and anecdotal accounts from household visit and focus groups held throughout the pilot phase. Though the data does not provide statistically significant results on the differences of pellet uptake of each model due to the small sample size, the data does provide valuable insights into the most cost effective distribution models and lessons learned about pellet uptake in Kenya.
2. Factors Effecting Uptake

2.1 Introduction to the Community Unit Approach

With pellet fuel being a completely new product in the market sensitization with the community is important for them to understand what the fuel is, how it works and the multiple benefits it can offer. For the initial stage of this project we worked closely with PATH, a non-profit organization focusing on healthcare innovations, to use the network of Community Health Volunteers (CHVs) as an entry point into the community. Organized into groups called Community Units (CUs) each one consists of around 20 – 40 Community Health Volunteers who are led by a Community Health Extension Worker (CHEW) an employee of the Ministry of Health. The CHVs themselves operate mainly on a volunteer basis although they receive stipends to participate in certain activities. PATH was particularly interested in helping the CHVs generate additional income through the sale of energy products.

The CHVs have between 50 -100 household that fall under their supervision whom they visit on a regular basis to promote health interventions and collect data on the same. As such they are ideally placed in the community to introduce new ideas to households and promote products that have a health benefit such as the pellet fuel and gasifier stove. The Community Units formed the entry point for us into the communities that we targeted through the 3 distribution models.

The first CU we targeted was Karapul in Siaya, consisting of 4,105 households and 40 CHVs, who were extensively involved in the design of the project participating in focus groups and group meetings around the structure and design of the program. It was this group that helped us to brand the pellet fuel as Pika Poa (meaning ‘cook good’ in English). The Philips stove was also branded as the Supa Cooker. We engaged this group early on in the project planning in June 2015 and they received the first stoves at the end of September. With the group in Siaya we decided to pilot a reseller distribution model. With this model we would select static resellers such as local kiosk owners or vendors who would stock the pellet fuel and be selling points within the local community. The Karapul unit is based out of Siaya town which is a small town with a population of 41,174 people based in a mainly rural, agricultural county. The CHVs in the group are spread across the town and its rural surroundings. Most households targeted would be described as peri-urban with those outside the town being predominantly rural.

The second area we targeted was Nyalenda, based in an area of informal housing in Kisumu City. The CHVs in this location are organized into four sub-groups and we initially targeted one of these CUs consisting of around 18 CHVs covering 11,430 households, although we later extended the project to include other CUs. This group received the first products at the end of October 2015. Nyalenda is a low income urban area of Kisumu City consisting mainly of informal housing located within close proximity to each other. With this group we decided to test a model having CHVs sell the fuel to other members of the community.

The final group that we worked with under the project was based in the Mamboleo area located on the outskirts of Kisumu town (around 8km from central Kisumu). The local community units we worked here consist of 3,420 households and around 45 CHWs. This is predominantly a peri-urban location but many of the households further out from the market center are in a rural setting. This group received their first products at the end of February.
2016. With this group we decided to test a rider model whereby household could order pellets and they would be delivered via motorbike to their house.

2.2 Initial Product Marketing

Under the original project plan we marketed the products (the gasifier stove and fuel) to the CHVs for them to use in their own homes. The idea was, that after buying into the product and realizing the benefits of its use, they would become champions in the community, introducing the product to households under their supervision that would also sign up for the product. On introducing the product to the Community Units the CHVs demonstrated a lot of enthusiasm for them. However when it came to the sign up events (in which the users pay their lease fees, fill in the lease agreement and take the products to start using in their home) only a handful of the CHVs actually signed up. For example in Karapul which consists of 40 CHVs only 7 of them initially signed up for the product as the first users. In our Nyalenda group which consisted of around 18 CHVs we had 8 of them initially sign up.

As with any product that is new and untested in the market it is early adopters that are initially willing to buy the item and use it. Many people are unwilling to take the product until they have seen it working in other people’s homes and heard the experience of other users. This is particular true where a significant investment is involved as is the case here. As such this limited the initial number of CHVs that signed up for the product themselves. We continued to work with the community groups to increase the number of CHV users having those that initially took the product share their experiences with other members of the group to convince them of the benefits of the product. However some of the first CHVs that took the product felt that it was more expensive than the fuels they were originally using which may have discouraged other members of the groups. This resulted in further CHV taking the products, with 32 of our final users being CHVs as per the distribution below;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Location</th>
<th>Total Number of CHVs in all sub-units</th>
<th>Number of CHVs who signed up for the project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Siaya</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyalenda</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamboleo</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the initial uptake from the CHVs for the product was lower than expected we subsequently opened up the opportunity to the rest of the community in our target areas that were able to access the fuel. To do this we worked through our existing customers and asked them to give us referrals of people that had seen them using the stove and had expressed an interest in also signing up. Initial this consisted of family members and neighbors of the existing users. After receiving only a few referrals initially, we incentivized customers by offering them 50 KES of airtime for every person they successfully referred – meaning the users must successfully pass through the trial period and go on to purchase fuel. Whilst this did provide incentive for a few individuals it had little effect on increasing the overall number of referrals we received. As a subsequent approach we ran a competition in Jan 2016, in which the user that referred the most new customers would win a shopping voucher. Again whilst it provided motivation for some individuals it did not generate as many referrals as we had hoped.
Table 2: Number of referrals received before, during and after the shopping voucher promotion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referral time period</th>
<th>Number of referrals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 weeks before the shopping voucher promotion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During the promotion (5 weeks)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 weeks after the promotion</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 2 shows the shopping voucher had little effect and the increase in referrals is more likely to be attributed to the increase in users and increase in general awareness of the produce with the increase in users.

Figure 1: Pika Poa customers and winner of the referral competition receiving her shopping voucher

Marketing considerations
The main fuel that Pika Poa is competing against is charcoal. In urban and peri urban areas charcoal is readily available and most households can access it within close proximity to their house. Our baseline data shows that 82% of households who took the stove were using charcoal either as their primary or secondary fuel. Out of these, 69% bought the fuel 1 km away or less from their home. For people to switch to using pellet fuel, making it equally easy to access will be an important factor. The ideal scenario is to have the majority of users situated in a 1 km radius from the point of resale. As such our marketing needs to be very focused in the areas we are targeting and traditional marketing channels that reach more general populations may not be as effective. Referrals between family and neighbors are a good way of promoting the products to people within a close proximity.

---

1 The promotion ran for 5 weeks and the table compares this with the 5 weeks before and after.
Additional criteria were used to vet the customers that we signed up as shown in 
*Text Box 1*. Since we were subsidizing the price of the stove technology the customer is 
agreeing to certain terms and conditions; for example they must pay quarterly lease fees and 
agree to be buying Pika Poa fuel on a regular basis. As such we wanted to ensure customers 
had this ability to pay, commitment to switch fuels and ability to be tracked throughout the 
program. For tracking purposes referrals are a good system as they provide an additional 
contact person to help follow up with the user. However the criteria below further reduced 
the pool of customers we were targeting in the program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Checklist for Pika Poa Customers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. You are a CHW in the required CU / you have been referred by a CHW or an existing customer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. You live within the pilot location and are able to easily access the fuel sales point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. You are willing to switch all of your cooking to pellet fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. You are ready to pay the first installment today and are willing and able to pay the future installments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. You understand the terms and conditions of the lease and that if after the trial period you do not buy Pika Poa fuel or pay your lease fees your lease is invalid and the stove will be taken back.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Text Box 1: Criteria for signing up new customer for Pika Poa*

2.3 Additional Approaches

One of the challenges we experienced with signing up users through referrals is the ability to 
turn a potential customer’s interest into a purchasing user. Once we had received a sufficient 
number of referrals we would arrange for a sign up event at which EcoZoom staff would invite 
all the referrals to participate. This event involved training on the use of the stove and fuel 
and how the lease works, after which they can sign up for the product, provide their baseline 
information and take home training and marketing material. We found that only a small number of the referrals would actually come to the event and sign up. This was mainly due 
to availability of funds; when a person was referred they had funds available but when we 
came to do the sign up event a week later they had already spent the money on other needs.

To overcome this we tested the idea of having an agent within the community who could sign 
up new households as and when they became interested and had the funds available to sign up. We tested this with our group in Siaya and trained our pellet reseller to also take new users through the stove training, lease agreement and baseline data. The agent receive a commission of 500 KES for every user they successfully signed up (meaning they went on to purchase a minimum quantity of fuel) to motivate them in this activity.

This method still did not produce high numbers of signs up with the agent signing up 5 new users over a period of 11 weeks. In this case it appeared our agent had a high standard of vetting for the users that she was willing to sign up. We also experienced challenges that the agent had not given the new users all the necessary information about the fuel and how the lease agreement works and in some cases had misled them on aspects of the program. However we still feel the use of community agents would be necessary in signing up new
users to scale up the program but they would require close supervision and training to make sure they were communicating the right messages.

After the initial sign ups of CHVs we struggled to get new customers for the fuel in the following three months through referrals and the agent method we piloted. In February, we approached our third group in Mamboleo to pilot our final distribution model. Again we initially marketed the product to the CHVs and had 14 of them sign up after which we opened it to referrals. However in this case as well as individual referrals we were able to get referrals to women’s groups in the area, where we received a lot of interest in the product which translated to actual sign ups. In the Mamboleo group we were able to sign up 32 users in the space of 2 months.

![Figure 2: No of users we signed up each month](image)

![Figure 3: Summary of marketing approaches used and no. of user signed up through each approach](image)
2.4 Lessons Learnt for Product Uptake

x Community Health Volunteers are a good way to make entry into a community and introduce new products and ideas. As members of the community themselves they understand well the needs and local dynamics and represented a trusted person who has easy access to households. In our pilot, 80% of users were either CHVs or referred by a CHV.

x However CHVs engage in many different activities and may have competing priorities. This can limit the availability and frequency in which they can engage in promotion. Providing incentives to users to engage in product promotion can increase this but any incentives provided need to be offset against the increase in uptake they produce.

x Not everyone is an early adopter and wants to try new technology. Many people want to see a product working first before they will decide to buy it, limiting the initial uptake of any new innovations. As such it can take time for a new product to gain traction within a community and this should be accounted for in initial pilots.

x The referral system was an effective way to get early users of the technology although the uptake of the product remained slow (potentially due to other factors as described here). In addition, the users we signed up developed in scattered pockets and building up a high density of households around a central sales point proved challenging.

x Having energy champions within the community is an effective way to promote a new product and gain new users. Out of 41 referrals, 19 came from just two individuals (46%). These energy champions often engage in promotion, not for financial rewards, but because they believe in your product and have a sense of shared commitment in bringing benefits to the community. Identifying and supporting these champions for your products is important and they can be further developed to take on formal roles as the business scales up.

x When using community volunteers or champions to promote a product or idea it is important to ensure they are communicating the right messages. This requires providing them with the right support, training and materials to do this.

x New customers need the ability to sign up and access products at their convenience and when they have the money available. They often need time to consider an investment in a product after initial seeing it advertised. Our target consumers have competing priorities for their limited income, if they are unable to access the products when they are ready it is likely funds will be diverted to other pressing needs.

x It is important to have adequate vetting of users of the technology when you are making a financial investment in that customer and expecting a return through fuel usage. It is important to learn through early users which types of customers generate the highest usage rates and refine your marketing approach to target them.

x Whilst our approach for marketing and sign up had an effect on how quickly we were able to get new users to sign up, finding the right type of people was just as important.
Where customers were open to new innovations, had more disposable income and enthusiasm for environmental issues uptake appeared to be quicker.

2.5 Customer Loyalty Program

During the pilot phase of the project we ran a customer loyalty scheme in which users earned points on their pellet purchases that translated into rewards on reaching certain milestones. The aim of this reward program was twofold;

1. The program would provide an incentive for customers to be continually using pellet fuel to earn more points and hence gain rewards.
2. To earn the points household had to register each of their pellet purchases using the serial number on the pellet packaging. This registration provided us with a way to track household pellet purchases which allowed us to analyze household usage rates and monitor compliance with the stove lease agreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Target No. of days</th>
<th>Points required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EcoZoom T-shirt</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free 2kg bag of pellets</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free 100 KES airtime</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 KES off a solar lantern</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Reward structure for the customer loyalty program

During the pilot phase of the project 50 customers accessed a reward through the customer loyalty program as shown in table 4 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>No of customer whom accessed</th>
<th>% of the total users</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EcoZoom T-shirt</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free 2kg bag of pellets</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free 100 KES airtime</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 KES off a solar lantern</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 Table 4: Data on customers that access each reward

The original design of the customer loyalty program was done before we had started selling fuel to our first customers. At this time we had expected fuel usage rates of approx. 1-1.5 kg a day. However in reality the average usage rates across users was much less – approx. 0.35 kg/day for our active users, and fuel uptake was generally lower than expected. As such this meant that during the pilot phase no users attained the fourth reward and very few users attained the third reward. This left some users feeling that the rewards were spaced too far apart and limited the motivational impact that they had.
During the end of pilot surveys customers were asked how much of an influence the customer loyalty program was in their purchasing habits (according to the defined statements below). The results are shown in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>No of people</th>
<th>% of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earning points and getting rewards has motivated me to buy a lot more Pika Poa fuel</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earning points and getting rewards is a nice idea and I sometimes think about it when buying Pika Poa fuel</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earning points and getting rewards has had no effect on my decision to buy Pika Poa fuel</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. In addition we received anecdotal feedback from user on the customer loyalty scheme during focus group discussions as shown in Text Box 2.

The results show that the majority of the users were aware of the rewards and how to earn them and they found it a motivational factor in their purchases. However the low number of customers actually accessing the rewards shows that whilst it is a ‘nice idea’ there are other stronger factors such as available funds and cooking habits that ultimately influence purchases.

Text Box 2: Customer views on the customer loyalty program

Customer Quotes on the Impact of the Customer Loyalty Scheme

‘When I got the [EcoZoom] T-shirt I was very happy and I felt very proud because now the people who doubted the program would think otherwise and also get motivated to use the stove more. It also forced some of the people to come and see the stove and I could explain how the stove was working.’

‘I felt good getting a reward from Ecozoom and that made me want to get more rewards hence I need to buy and register more pellets because that is the only way to get the rewards’

‘I felt proud of the gift and wanted to get other gifts and thus I wanted to buy more pellets and register them to get more points’
Whilst a rewards scheme can be a good way to motivate customers in their purchase and keep them engaged with the company it is important to consider the financial cost of any rewards and the payback from the increased uptake that they create. For example if we assume a 10 KES profit margin on each kg of pellets sold, when a user reaches 50 points we have made 500 KES of profit. However if we have given them a T-shirt worth 500 KES and a free bag of pellets worth 100 KES then we have actually made a loss. During the pilot, the rewards, particularly EcoZoom branded items, also provided an opportunity to promote the EcoZoom brand early on in the introduction of the product and provide further encouragement for users to adopt this new product. However in the longer term the pay back of the rewards would need to be considered carefully and may be restricted to low cost items such as airtime and fuel or rewards that are given out on a one of promotional basis.

Feedback from customers suggested that they would prefer reward items such as EcoZoom branded umbrellas, lesos (a material wrap used as a skirt) and caps. Several users also felt that presenting the rewards in group situations such as during community meetings would present further motivation to the user by adding an element of peer approval. They also suggested that they should be informed periodically on how many points they had accumulated and if the points were enough to redeem for a reward. Other users had difficulty registering the pellet serial numbers using their phone. They felt the process was long and they were prone to forgetting to register whenever they made a purchase. They recommended changing the system to an easier way of accumulating the points.

![Image](image.png)

*Figure 4: Pika Poa customers that have received T-shirts as rewards from the customer loyalty program*

### 2.6 Product Packaging

The Pika Poa fuel was packaged into three different sizes 2kg, 7kg and 16kg. It was important to have a range of sizes on offer for customers particularly the smaller sizes which are more affordable. As predominantly charcoal users our target consumers are used to being able to
buy fuel in values as small as 50 KES, which can be the only amount that a household has available for fuel on a given day. The table below shows the pricing of the different sized bags and how they made up the total volume of pellets sold during the pilot.

Table 6: Breakdown of different bag sizes sold during the pilot phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bag Size / kg</th>
<th>Retail Price / KES</th>
<th>% of total number of bags sold</th>
<th>% as a total of the volume sold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from Table 6 all of the different sizes of bags sold during the program suggesting that a range of sizes is needed to suit individual preferences. The smaller sized bags are important for consumers that do not have the financial capacity to buy the fuel in volume. However some users and particularly those that lived further away from the selling point preferred to take larger bags to reduce the time they had to spend on collection. We also observed that our customers with the highest usage rates tended to favor the larger bag sizes. On average, the 7kg and 16kg pellet bags were a favorite for the top users accounting for 70% of their total pellet fuel purchases. For customers using the fuel everyday it appears they are willing to invest in bigger quantities to make sure it was readily available. Some users also noticed that it was cheaper purchasing the bigger capacity bags than buying the smaller capacity bags.

2.7 Cost Effectiveness

During the customer surveys respondents were asked whether they thought the price for Pika Poa was too high, too low or about right. The pricing for Pika Poa is as shown in Table 6 and was structured so that it was similar to charcoal (or lower when charcoal is priced above 50 KES / kg) as well as being able to offer a margin for the reseller. The users’ feeling on Pika Poa was nearly evenly split between those who thought the pricing was just right – 51% (25) and those who thought the pricing was too high-49% (24) as can be seen in the chart below. The top Pika Poa users were equally divided on their views on the pricing of the fuel 50% reported the price to be about right and also the pricing to be too high. The majority of medium users (56%) reported the Pika Poa pricing to be too high while the majority of low users reported the Pika Poa pricing to be about right.
In the initial period of the pilot, we wanted to understand how the Pika Poa pellets and the gasifier stove compared against charcoal and the Kenya Ceramic Jiko (the common locally made charcoal stove) in terms of efficiency to cook and cost effectiveness. In this regard, we conducted cooking tests both in the lab and in the users' households. The Controlled Cooking Test (CCT) showed both time and fuel cost savings when using Pika Poa Pellets with the Philips cookstove. Average time savings were recorded to be up to 17% while fuel cost savings were up to 7% when compared with charcoal in the Kenyan Ceramic Jiko. However, the pellet stove consumed more fuel per gram of food cooked when compared with the charcoal stove. This could be due to the slow cooking foods (such as Githeri) that required low heat over a long period of time. The Pika Poa pellets have a high burning rate compared with charcoal which implies more pellets were burning per minute when compared with charcoal.

Table 7: Summary of Controlled Cooking Test results for different cooking task on both a KCJ using charcoal and with the Philips gasifier using pellets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooking Task</th>
<th>Cooking Ugali</th>
<th>Boiling Githeri (Mix of Maize and Beans)</th>
<th>Cooking a meal (ugali, beef, vegetables)</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pellets</td>
<td>Pellets</td>
<td>Pellets</td>
<td>Pellets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>Charcoal</td>
<td>Charcoal</td>
<td>Charcoal</td>
<td>Charcoal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Fuel Consumption (g/l)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time to cook (minutes)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of fuel that will complete the cooking task (KES)</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>20.88</td>
<td>56.35</td>
<td>37.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Summary of Water Boiling Test Results for the KCJ using charcoal and with the Philips gasifier using pellets.
Water boiling tests conducted in the lab also showed the gasifier stove and pellets being 51% more efficient than charcoal in the Kenya Ceramic Jiko (KCJ) when completing a cooking task. A 5-liter water boiling test was conducted both with the Philips gasifier stove and the KCJ using pellets and charcoal respectively. Water boiling test protocol 4.2.3 was used to ensure reproducibility of the test results. Table 8 shows a summary of the results obtained from the water boiling tests. The tests show that whilst pellets burn more efficiently than charcoal, marginally less charcoal was used compared with pellets, making it the cheaper option. However there were significant time savings of up to 48% when using pellets compared with charcoal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Pellets</th>
<th>Charcoal</th>
<th>% difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific Fuel Consumption (g/l)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time to cook (minutes)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High power thermal efficiency (%)</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of fuel that will complete the cooking task (KES)</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>12.36</td>
<td>-51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: A user participating in the Controlled Cooking Tests

During baseline data collection and the final household surveys we asked households to describe their monthly fuel expenditure across all fuels that they use in their homes. Table 9 compares data from the nine households who were the most active pellet users. Across these users the average daily pellet usage was 0.51kg. As can be observed from the table for the customers that adopted the pellets and used them on a regular basis, there is a significant reduction in the monthly fuel expenditure with average monthly savings of 36%. One user who was running a small hotel and using charcoal and Pika Poa pellets to cook for customers reported average monthly savings on his fuel purchases of 55% (KES 18,532).

Table 9: Comparison of monthly fuel expenditure before and after pellets were introduced for the top users
Average Monthly fuel expenditure before Pika Poa | Average Monthly fuel expenditure using Pika Poa | Average monthly fuel expenditure savings | % average monthly savings
---|---|---|---
KES 2,017.14 | KES 1,312.86 | KES 704.29 | 36%

During the final households surveys users were directly asked whether they thought they were making any monetary savings from use of Pika Poa. The majority of them (55%) said they were saving on fuel expenditure from use of Pika Poa. 18% of the users said using Pika Poa actually increased their fuel expenditure, whereas for 27% it was not clear whether they were saving money or not. The main reasons people thought that Pika Poa was more expensive for them, included that some of these users were collecting firewood previously and weren’t spending any money on fuel before but were now having to spend money on pellets. Whereas this was more expensive for them they valued other factors about the fuel such as the time saving and convenience of purchase.

Other users thought the pellets were expensive and burned very quickly. As our WBT tests showed pellets burn at a high heat and are more suited to high heat applications rather than low heat applications such as simmering food for a long period. In low heat applications it is likely that the user would use more pellets compared to charcoal which is why some users felt it was more expensive. This perception may also be worsened by people not operating the stove as efficiently as it can operate. Operating the stove to maximum efficiency requires controlling the amount of fuel you use and the speed of the fan, this can take some practice for users to get right.

For the 27% of users who said it wasn’t clear to them whether they were saving on their fuel expenditure the main reason they gave was they hadn’t been keeping a record of the costs. This was a common challenge during our monitoring of the fuel, that households did not have an accurate understanding of how much money they spent on fuel, due to multiple fuels being used and often different people using the fuel. One user commented that although she spends more on pellets, she preferred them as they are of consistent quality compared with charcoal which, although it is cheaper is sometimes of poor quality and cannot be used.

**Table 10: Summary of user perception on whether pellet fuel saves them money**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Percentage of users</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I think using Pika Poa saves me money on my household fuel expenditure</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think using Pika Poa increases my households fuel expenditure</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s not clear to me if Pika Poa saves me money or not</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings from the pilot suggest that using pellet fuel can save households money but it is highly dependent on the way the pellets are used. Our in house testing showed that higher levels of fuel efficiency were experienced when using pellets for short, high heat cooking applications such as cooking tea or ugali, whereas for long, low heat applications, such as cooking maize or beans, pellets could be more expensive. It is also requires the user to tailor
the way they use the stove to maximize the fuel efficiency for example only filling the stove with as much fuel as is needed and adding small amounts of pellet to lengthening cooking times in a controlled manner. This takes time for users to get right and is a point that many user never reached. As such there were mixed opinions from users whether they felt pellets were a cost effective fuel or not.

Some customers were previously highly reliant on firewood which they would collect for free hence switching to Pika Poa required them to start purchasing fuel instead. As such Pika Poa would be more expensive for them but many of them were willing to pay the price to upgrade to a more modern fuel that could save them significant time. However not everyone values time as much as they value money.

When asked about their ideal pricing for the stove, the majority of users interviewed (59%) preferred having the price of the stove remain at KES 5000. Paying for the stove in installments was certainly attractive to the majority of the users with 43% saying they would prefer paying for the stove in installments lasting a period of 12 months.

Table 11: Preferred price for the Philips gasifier stove

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommended Philips Stove Price (KES)</th>
<th>% of Users</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Preferred payment plan for the gasifier stove

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stove Payment Plan</th>
<th>% of Users</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upfront</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.8 Stove Repayment Rates

The majority of users whose 1st lease fee installment was due, successfully made the payment although it was noted that they didn’t always pay on the actual day when the fees were due. The users had a choice of making small partial payments before the 3 month period was up but very few managed to do this preferring to wait until the quarter was up before making a full payment. 42% of the total users didn’t pay their first lease fee installment despite repeated reminders. All the top users successfully cleared the first lease fee installment albeit 2 weeks late. The majority of users in each category paid the first lease fee installment despite the delays with 100% of top users, 63% of medium users and 51% of low users making the payment.

This shows that the top users realized the value of using the pellet fuel and as such were willing to continue paying for the stove. However overall the payment rates are low and represent a significant challenge in financing the cost of the stove without EcoZoom losing money. Whilst the lease agreement stated the stove would be repossessed if the lease fees were not paid, in reality this required significant follow up to achieve and many still remain with users.
2.9 Product Impacts

The majority of users (92%) interviewed in the final survey said they saved time when using Pika Poa. Only 8% felt using Pika Poa wasn’t saving them any time. The majority of those who said they saved time spent the saved time on doing house chores and resting. Other activities that they did were tending to their farms and businesses, looking after their children, catching up on news and doing community work.

During the final household surveys, users were asked what their favorite things and least favorite things were about cooking with Pika Poa. The majority of users (61%) reported Pika Poa cooking fast as their favorite thing. On being asked their least favorite thing about cooking with Pika Poa, the majority of users (41%) said they didn’t have any dislikes about their cooking with Pika Poa. For those users who had a dislike for cooking with Pika Poa, the majority of them (16%) reported smoke and staining of saucepans as their least favorite thing when cooking with Pika Poa. The smoke appeared when lighting the stove and when reloading the stove with pellets during the cooking task. The tables below illustrate other points raised by the users.

**Table 13: Users favorite things about cooking with Pika Poa**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Users’ favorite thing about cooking with Pika Poa</th>
<th>% of users</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It cooks fast</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It produce no dust/clean to handle</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is economical/saves money/efficient</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It doesn’t produce smoke/stain sufuria</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It lights quickly</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is easy to pack 2%
It cooks food well 2%

Table 14: User least favorite thing about cooking with Pika Poa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Users' least favorite thing about cooking with Pika Poa N=49</th>
<th>% of Users</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It smokes a lot/stains saucepans</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is difficult to control the fire</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pellets are expensive</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pellets burn too quickly</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fire requires constant tending</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is difficult to light</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fire is too hot and burn holes in saucepans</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pellet crumble easily</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is not safe for children to use</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Users were surveyed on what they wanted to be improved on the stoves that would increase usage or make more people start using it. The majority of users (59%) were satisfied with how the stove looked and worked and didn't have any suggestions on the pellet stove improvements. For those who had suggestions, the majority (18%) wanted to be able to regulate the heat without the stove being too smoky. These users reported that at times they wanted to cook in low heat especially when simmering some foods but the fire got too smoky when they reduced the fan speed/heat. Other suggestions made by users are outlined in the table below.

Table 15: Users recommendation on improvements that could be made to the stove

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Improvements that could be made on the stove to increase uptake/usage N=49</th>
<th>% of Users</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the size of the stove</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be able to regulate heat without the stove being too smoky/improve fan speed to reduce smoke</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve the charging system to reduce breakages</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The base should be made of metal or a more durable material that wouldn't be damaged by falling hot embers</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change pot rests as they damage the bottom of saucepans</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Comparison of distribution models

3.1 Introduction

One of the main aims of the pilot phase of the project was to assess the best methods for last mile distribution of pellet fuel to households considering factors such as access for the users, cost of distribution for EcoZoom and ability to scale. Setting up a cost effective supply chain and distribution network for a new fuel is challenging and often proves to be expensive for the household market, where you are dealing with a large number of low volume customers.

During the pilot we tested three different distribution models as listed below;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivery Model</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Static Reseller</td>
<td>Using a retailer at a fixed sales point such as an existing kiosk or shop selling households items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHV reseller</td>
<td>Using a Community Health Volunteer to act as a sales agent and sell fuel to households in their community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery Model</td>
<td>Using a bike to deliver fuel direct to people’s houses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 Overview of delivery Models

**Static resellers**
This model utilizes static vendors in the neighborhoods where fuel users live to be retailers of the pellet fuel. These could include shops, kiosks or road side vendors and aims to replicate the way that many household currently buy goods such as vegetables and charcoal. We aimed to locate vendors that were accessible for our users in terms of location and opening hours, reliable and committed to the product. The static resellers buy the fuel from EcoZoom at a wholesale price before selling on to the households at a higher retail price which earns them a small margin.

We piloted this model with our users in Siaya town and were fortunate to find a vendor that was very committed to the new products, herself becoming one of our highest users of the fuel. Our vendor has two shops in the town; one a book stall located in our target neighborhood and another shop selling sodas located in the main town. This was ideal to give multiple locations where users could buy the fuel. Our vendor demonstrated good business acumen and was able to purchase pellets up front or with limited credit that was repaid promptly. Her belief in the product and use of the fuel herself was key as she took on the role of a champion within the community, helping to refer new users and provide advice on registering fuel and stove usage when customers bought from her shop.

On the downside it proved difficult to find a retail location that was accessible for all users. The idea was to build up a high density of users around a central sales point but in reality this proved difficult and users were more scattered. As a result, for some users they had to travel a significant distance to reach the sales point. To overcome this we looked at the option of having additional resellers closer to other user, however for the business to offer enough income to the reseller they need to be able to service at least 15 households each and this was not possible.
CHV Reseller
This model is similar to the static reseller above but in this case the reseller is a Community Health Volunteer who sells the fuel to households in their community. It is up to the CHV how households buy the fuel, either collecting from their house or the local health facility or with the CHV delivering the fuel as they conduct visits in the community. Again the CHV buys the fuel from EcoZoom at a wholesale price and sells at a higher retail price making some margin in the process.

We piloted this model with our users in Nyalenda. Whilst our reseller in this case was not as active in their own use of the Pika Poa fuel they were a well-known figure in the community who was able to easily interact with the users of the fuel. Since our reseller owned a bicycle and was mobile within the community in most cases he personally delivered fuel to customers’ households. This proved convenient for them as again they were spread out across the area and some were a significant distance from the resellers’ location. However our reseller soon came to find this arrangement time consuming on his part by which point many customers had come to expect this service from him. The income generating activity can also present opportunities for CHVs to engage in additional healthcare promotion and provide incentive for them to continue with these activities. For example our reseller commented that, ‘my social work has improved by knowing and visiting new households who are Pika Poa customers [and as a result] I have gotten more clients on health matters’.

Our CHV reseller also had a job at a local hospital in addition to their CHV activities that meant he was only available at certain times during the day for people to order pellets. There were instances where users were left without fuel since the reseller was not available and we had to arrange for a direct delivery to supply customers.

Delivery Model
In this model EcoZoom directly took orders for fuel from the households and then organized with a local motorbike rider to deliver the fuel to their house. The households paid for the pellets direct to EcoZoom via mobile money service M-Pesa and the fuel was delivered in most cases the same day. EcoZoom sold the pellet fuel direct to end users at the normal retail price.
This model had the advantage of offering a higher sales price to EcoZoom for the pellets since it cut out the margin for the reseller. It also meant that customers didn’t have to travel any distance to collect their fuel with it being delivered to their doorstep. Several customers liked this model because it meant they were paying directly to EcoZoom for their fuel and this removed any chance for middleman to inflate the price or reduce the quality of the fuel (which often happens with charcoal).

However the model proved costly for EcoZoom (see section 3.3) since customers would order pellets at different times to suit their usage habits. This meant that we could send a motorbike to deliver 2 bags of 2kg pellets and the cost of the deliver would be greater than the cost of the fuel. In addition many customers found the process of calling EcoZoom to place the order and paying via mobile money cumbersome and an additional expense. This is especially true for households in more rural areas – whilst the delivery of the fuel is very convenient for them they would have to walk into the town to put money on their phone to be able to pay for the order. Having a large number of individual orders also required more time in processing and reconciliation on EcoZoom’s part. In addition some customers preferred to have a place where they knew pellets would always be available so that they could collect them at their convenience.

To overcome some of these challenges we also arranged for pellets to be stored at the local health facility, if people preferred to collect them from there. During the pilot phase of the project 580 kg of pellets were collected from the facility compared to 169 kg which was delivered direct to households, hence even when direct delivery was offered for no extra cost most users preferred to collect the fuel in person. After 3 months of running the delivery model in an aim to reduce the cost of pellet delivery for groups that were further away from the facility, we requested them to all order together and have delivery on a set day each week.

*Feedback from Customers*

During the household surveys we asked households what they liked and disliked about the delivery models and their feedback echoed the observations given above. In Siaya, 83% (15/18) of households surveyed said that convenience and reliability were the things they liked the most, commenting that they knew there would always be pellets available at the resellers shop. Only 4 out of the 18 respondents had complaints, with 3 of these people saying the distance to the reseller was too far and 1 person saying that the pellet fuel was heavy to carry.

Again in Nyalenda where we worked with a CHV reseller the things people liked the most was the convenience of buying pellets, albeit only 60% of respondents, with several people specifically commenting that they liked the fact that the CHV delivered the fuel. One person also commented that the fuel was easy to carry. Three people had complaints that the distance to purchase was too far.

In Mamboleo where users could have their fuel delivered or alternatively collect from their local health facility 87% of respondents said they liked the fact it was convenient and easy to access the fuel because of the delivery option. However 6 out of the 16 respondents complained that the process of paying by M-pesa was cumbersome and 2 people thought access was a challenge.

Suggestions on improvements included the option to pay by cash and have local resellers to improve access further.
Another benefit of the fuel that came up in focus group discussions was the presentation and cleanliness of the fuel. Many people commented that they liked being able to buy the fuel from a shop that was clean and the packaging meant that they could carry the pellets with other shopping items without the fear of it getting dirty.

Table 16: Summary of Pros and Cons of the three delivery models piloted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Pro’s</th>
<th>Con’s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Static Reseller</td>
<td>Similar to current buying habits User buy at their convenience Work with existing businesses Reseller can act as a champion of fuel in the community Create income generating opportunities in community Low effort for order processing and payment tracking Bulk delivery to reseller</td>
<td>Added cost for reseller margin Sales volumes do not support many resellers Relatively low margin available for resellers Some customers may have to travel a significant distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHV Reseller</td>
<td>CHV can act as a champion of fuel in the community CHV trusted and well known in the community Create income generating opportunities for CHV to do health promotion Low effort for order processing and payment tracking Bulk delivery to CHV</td>
<td>Added cost for reseller margin CHV may not have business acumen CHV may be busy with other activities limiting availability Some customers may have to travel significant distance to selling point May be cumbersome for CHV if customers expect them to deliver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery Model</td>
<td>Higher profit margin for EcoZoom Direct payment cuts out risk of inflation by resellers Customers don’t have to travel to collect fuel</td>
<td>High delivery cost Time consuming deliveries Mobile money payments can be difficult for customers Individual order processing time consuming Waiting for deliver can be inconvenient</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3 Analysis of commercial viability of each model
Income Generating Opportunities
To build a network of distributors and agents for any product they need to be able to earn enough income from selling the product to make it attractive to them. Table 17 below shows the margins that were available to resellers during the pilot phase for the pellet fuel. Resellers earn 5 KES per kg of pellets sold, which is in line with reported margins for the sale of charcoal fuel.

Table 17: Profit margins available to reseller selling Pika Poa fuel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bag Size / kg</th>
<th>Retail Price / KES</th>
<th>Wholesale Price / KES</th>
<th>Retail margin / KES</th>
<th>Retail Margin / KES per kg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The text box shows an example order for a pellet reseller and the total profit margin that might be available. It shows that the profit available to the reseller is relatively small. This is particularly true since during the pilot we found the uptake of pellets to be lower than initially anticipated with resellers selling on average 124 kg of pellets per month. For example our static reseller sold 52,895 KES (518 USD) worth of pellets over the 9 months of the pilot period making a 5575 KES (55 USD) profit margin which equates to around 619 KES (6 USD) per month. If you compare this to her other lines of business that include selling sodas, in this business she can make a profit margin of up to 1620 KES (16 USD) per day from average monthly soda sales of 255,200 KES (2552 USD). This echoed feedback from the resellers who complained that the customers were too few and stock moved slowly.

We required the resellers to make a down payment when initially buying Pika Poa stock but also offered them a small credit limit (4500 KES) to ensure that they could keep stocked up. With the few resellers we worked with during the pilot we experienced full repayment rates for stock albeit not always on time. It did not present a major challenge during the pilot phase but from experience in our other business lines it is something that would have to be closely managed if the number of resellers was scaled up.

Whilst the margins offered during the pilot did not offer a substantial income for resellers, they saw it as a business requiring low effort that could easily be added to existing products. Feedback also indicated that they wanted to sell the fuel not only for financial gains but also to help improve the wellbeing and carbon footprint of their community.
In the long term however the profit to resellers would have to be increased to make the business more attractive, either through an increase in customers or increase in selling price to successfully build a sustainable network of vendors.

It is also worth noting that in addition to the reseller our pilot phases provided income generation for 5 people involved in the delivery of pellet fuel in each of the pilot locations.

![Image: A rider delivering pellets to a reseller](image)

**Figure 9: A rider delivering pellets to a reseller**

---

**EcoZoom cost of last mile distribution**

For us to establish a fuel distribution model that can be sustainable in the long term we need to consider its cost in making fuel available to customers. This cost is incurred by EcoZoom and takes away from the potential profits that will be earned. *Table 18* below shows the average cost of each model in delivering 1 kg of pellets to the point at which it is collected by the customer. The table shows that on average the cost of delivery to a static sales point is between 3.6 – 5.1 KES per kg of fuel depending on the size of the order and the individual agreement with the rider in that area. For the third model we have compared both the cost of direct delivery to households and also the cost for us to deliver to a central collection point where households collect their orders from. The cost for delivering to a collection point is similar to the reseller models but doing direct deliveries to households is significantly higher at 40.2 KES per kg of fuel. This is mainly due to small volumes of pellets being delivered on each trip compared to the bulk deliveries to the vendors. It is obvious that these individual household deliveries are not a cost effective approach but we were prepared to do this during the pilot phase to get users to adopt this particular model and for us to get feedback on its influence on uptake.

*Table 18: Cost to deliver 1kg of pellets for each delivery model*
## Delivery Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivery Model</th>
<th>Cost of delivery per kg of fuel / KES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Static Vendor</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHV Vendor</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection from health facility</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct household delivery</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These costs give an indication of what to expect but are likely to be high during the pilot phase compared to what could be achieved longer term and when considering economies of scale. During our pilot we paid a higher price for the deliveries since it was a new concept to the riders for them and we were unable to guarantee consistent demand. If the business was at a larger scale it could look into purchasing its own motorbike with a dedicated rider or could negotiate favorable rates with service providers due to higher demand for the services. An investment in a motorbike capable of carrying the weight of fuel in rugged terrain could be around 200,000 - 300,000 KES (1960 – 2940 USD) with monthly running costs of around 20,000 KES (294 USD). During the pilot we averaged monthly sales of around 385 kg which, considering the motorbike running costs alone, would still represent a delivery cost of 52 KES per kg if we had our own bike. Hence delivery is not cost effective until large volumes are achieved. During the early stages of the business it is likely that the above costs are representative of what could be achieved and the use external delivery riders is the best option.

### 3.4 Influence of models on usage rates

As well as considering the feedback from users on the different distribution models and the associated costs, the pilot aimed to understand if the models had an impact on the uptake and usage of customers. The below analysis compares some of the statistics across each model to draw conclusions on this where possible.

### Table 19: Summary of usage rates across the distribution models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Static Reseller</th>
<th>CHV Reseller</th>
<th>Delivery Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Users</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Brought(^2) / kg</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average daily usage rate during purchasing period(^3) / kg per day</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Av. daily usage rate of active customers during project period(^4) / kg per day</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) This is the total bought by all customers in the group across the pilot period  
\(^3\) This is the average daily usage rate based on purchases during the time customer were active  
\(^4\) This is the average daily usage rate based on purchases across the whole period the customer was in the pilot. It only considers customer that were active at the end of the period.
Table 19 shows that the static reseller group purchased the largest amount of pellet due to the fact that they have been purchasing pellets the longest. The average usage rates can be considered both in terms of the usage rate when the customer was active (the time between their first and last purchase) and also their usage rate over the whole period they were in possession of the stove. While customers are active they purchased between 0.32 – 0.40 kg a day with the CHV reseller group having a slightly higher usage rate. However, this can be misleading since some customers were only active for a short period which can result in high usage rates and skew the data. In addition we can consider the average usage rate for active customers across the whole period of the pilot. This rate is much lower at between 0.14 – 0.19 kg per day with the static reseller group having a slightly higher usage rate.

Figure 10 below goes on to show the average daily usage rates of customer against the number of days that the customers stayed active for the three distribution models. This graph considers only the customers that were active for more than 30 days hence eliminating customer for whom little data is available. Even considering these more active customers the vast majority fall below the 0.6 kg of pellets per day mark. It is difficult to determine any clear trends in how usage rates change over time, although customers in the delivery model do show some indication that usage drops off the longer they have been active. There are fewer customers that have been active over longer periods but still 5 of the longer users that have above 0.45 kg per day pellet usage. Whilst there are no clear trends linking usage rate to the different distribution model this graph highlights that usage rates across all the models are much lower than expected. Going into the pilot we predicted usage rates of between 1 -1.5 kg of pellets per day which in reality are closer to 0.3 kg / day with active users.
To try and monitor customers’ usage further we categorized them into 5 broad categories as below based on their usage and also their potential and interest in the project.

Table 20: Definition of usage categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition of category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High/Top</td>
<td>Households using an average of 0.4kg and more of Pika Poa daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Households using an average of between 0.2kg and 0.39kg of Pika Poa daily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Households using an average of 0.1kg or less of pellets per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>Users that stopped using the stove with no interest to re-start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned</td>
<td>User that returned the stove during the trial period</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12 to Figure 13 below show how customers fall into these categories in each of the different distribution models at the end of the pilot phase. As can be seen the majority of users fall into the low category, with the delivery model having the highest percentage in this category (59% of customers). The top and medium users combined make up 26-30% of the user in each category with the static reseller having the highest percentage. However the static reseller model also had the highest number of inactive users, which may be due to this model having been running the longest allowing more time for users to drop out.

Figure 12: Customer usage categorization for the static reseller model

Figure 11: Customer usage categorization for the static reseller model
The above categorizations are based on the pellet purchases that the customers register. We had around 85% registration rate during the pilot phase so some purchases are not represented in this analysis. During the customer surveys we asked users how they rated their usage of Pika Poa by getting them to pick which sentence best described them from the following:

1. I use Pika Poa for all of my cooking (with a few exceptions)
2. I don’t use Pika Poa for all my cooking but I use it most days
3. I don’t use Pika Poa every day I just use it when I have guests or for a special meal or occasion
4. I tried Pika Poa when I first took the stove but now I have stopped using it.

The graphs below show how customer rated themselves in the different distribution models.

---

5 note that the below graphs only cover the sample of users who took part in the final survey whereas the above graphs are for all of the users of the fuel.
As can be seen from the above graphs customers tend to rate their own usage as higher than the data from pellet registrations show. Under the customer lease agreement, if customer are not using Pika Poa regularly they have to return the stove, so this is likely to influence the customers into telling us their usage is higher than it might be. It was a challenge during the program to understand exactly why usage rates were not as high as expected due to the difference in customer perception of the fuel versus their actual usage rates from the registration data.

There is also a sense that customers use less pellets than we expected due to other factors as well. For example the stove is more efficient than we originally thought and customers are able to meet their cooking needs with fewer pellets. The reality of stove stacking also means that most household will use multiple stoves and fuels when this is possible. A significant proportion of household who buy the pellets were previously using multiple stoves (LPG, charcoal and firewood) and it is unrealistic to assume that households will exclusively use pellets. In addition many of our customers were out working most of the day or travelled as part of their work whilst others were single people without large families. As a result these customers were not consistently cooking in the household and hence had lower usage rates unrelated to their opinion on the pellet fuel.
3.5 Influence of Customer demographics on Usage Rates

In addition to the influence of the models on the uptake and usage of pellet fuel there may be other factors within the demographics of the customers that influence how likely they are to use pellets. In this section we will analyze some of these demographic factors and if there is any correlation on pellet usage rates.

**Gender**

It was noted that the average daily Pika Poa usage among the female users was higher than for the male users. It is important to note that we only considered users who were active at the end of the project period. Females made up 64% of active users while males represented 36% of active users. We also observed that for the male users, although it was a male who signed up for the stove, it was a female who used it once it got to the house. It would be advisable to include both partners (husband and wives) when rolling out similar project in order to get the perspectives of both individuals before buying the product. Females were on average using more Pika Poa daily (0.18kg/day) compared with their male counterparts (0.16kg/day) as can be seen in the chart below.

![Customer Split - Gender](chart1)

![Customer Usage rate (kg/day)-Gender](chart2)
Age
The majority of pellet users (70%) were aged between 30 and 49 years and had an average pellet usage rate of 0.18kg/day. However, the users with the highest average daily pellet use were those aged 50 years and above. These users made up 14% of the total active users and had a daily pellet usage rate of 0.26kg/day. These users were mainly women and they had expressed a commitment to use pellets with some of them transitioning to using only pellets for all their cooking. Two of the top Pika Poa users were in this age group.

![Customer Distribution and Usage rate (kg/day) - Age](image)

Figures 20: Customer characterization based on Age and gender

Location – urban / peri urban/rural
Pika Poa customers were spread out in three locations broadly categorized into rural (Mamboleo), peri-urban (Siaya) and urban (Nyalenda). The majority of the users (41%) were based in the rural location. It was noted that these users also had the highest Pika Poa usage rate of 0.19kg/day followed closely by the peri-urban users with a usage rate of 0.18kg/day. This is illustrated in the charts below. It is important to point out that the rural users had been activated for the shortest amount of time and thus the high usage rates could be due to the novelty of the product having not worn off them yet and they were still excited about using the new fuel.
Family Size

The majority of Pika Poa users (69%) had a family size of between 5 and 8 members. This group also had the highest average daily pellet usage rate at 0.20 kg per day. Users with a family size of 4 or less members made up 25% of the total active pellet users and had an average usage rate of 0.14 kg/day as is illustrated in the figures below.

Fuels already being used

The majority of Pika Poa users (63%) were previously using charcoal as their primary fuel as is illustrated in the figures below. A smaller number (37%) were using firewood as their main
fuel before signing up for Pika Poa. However, the firewood users had a higher average pellet usage rate (0.21kg/day) as compared to the charcoal users (0.19kg/day).

6 Note that the above charts are based on data collected from customers who were active at the end of the project period.

A similar trend was reported with users who had LPG stoves and those who didn’t. Those who had LPG stoves were fewer (19%) and their pellet usage rates were equally low (0.17kg/day) compared to those without LPG stoves (81%) who had a marginally higher pellet usage rate (0.18kg/day). This could be explained by the fact that Pika Poa pellets and the Supa Cooker give the similar benefits as an LPG stove of fast, clean cooking. This could be the reason why more people who didn’t have the LPG stove used Pika Poa more so as to enjoy these benefits compared to those who already had an LPG stove.
Figure 27: Customer distribution based on availability of an LPG stove in the household

Figure 28: Average daily pellet usage rate based on availability of an LPG stove in the household

Household income

The majority of Pika Poa users (50%) were earning an average monthly income of between KES 5,000 and 15,000. This class of users also had the lowest average daily pellet usage rate at 0.16kg/day. The users who reported the highest daily Pika Poa usage rate (0.32kg/day) were those earning between KES 15,001 and 30,000 per month.
Job / daily activities

The majority of Pika Poa users (45%) were business people with a fuel usage rate of 0.18kg/day. The Pika Poa users who had the highest usage rate were those with formal employment with a daily pellet usage rate of 0.25kg/day closely followed by farmers with a daily pellet usage rate of 0.24Kg/day.

Figure 32: Customer distribution and average daily pellet usage rate based on jobs/daily activities

Customers were asked which their preferred size of pellet bag to purchase was and the responses are shown in Figure 33. The graph shows that 2kg was the most popular bag size across all of the distribution models followed by 7 kg and 16 kg. For the delivery model when fuel can be delivered to the customer’s doorstep no one favored the larger sizes. Hence it suggests that availability of funds is more of a factor in decided what size bag to purchase rather than logistics of transporting it. It also highlights why the cost of doing the deliveries was particularly high, since most users preferred the small bag sizes. All users that expressed a preference for the 16kg bag size fell under the top and medium usage category suggesting that if customers are willing to buy a large bag size they are committing to using the fuel.

Figure 33: Average daily pellet usage rate in Kg/day based on customers’ job/daily occupation
3.6 Conclusions

Customers seemed to value convenience and reliability when giving feedback on the different deliver models. Knowing that the pellets were always there if they needed them was important. Convenience can also mean different things to different people; it could mean having the fuel delivered, having a sales point that can be accessed at any time or having an easy payment method. Results from this pilot show that having a fixed sales point seems to be the most preferred method for customers to access their pellets. The fixed sales point could take different forms it could be a local shop, health facility or home of a neighbor. Fixed sales points also had the lowest cost of last mile distribution to EcoZoom (around 3.6 KES/kg), which could be further reduced at scale where larger volumes could be delivered and more favorable rates negotiated.

Getting the right person as your reseller is important. Ideally the individual should be committed to the project and can also act as a champion in the community and point of information on the product. However in our pilot we only tried one person with each model so it is difficult to draw strong conclusions when comparing each one. There is not a significant different between the way a CHV and non CHV reseller would operate, what is important is that the reseller is well connected and accepted in the community.

Ideally customers want to access a sales point that is close to their home. However in reality a critical number of customers is needed to support a decent profit for each reseller. Hence whilst customer numbers are low it is likely that not all will be located close to the sales point.

Whilst the delivery model can prove convenient for people who live far from the sales point it is expensive to operate and can only be cost effective when higher sales volumes are achieved. Having delivery as a backup can be useful to cover issues of unavailability at retail points. However it should be prioritized for larger bag sizes or run in a structured manner as to target several customers in each trip.

Current profit margins available to resellers from the sales of Pika Poa are low compared to other household items. To maintain an effective network of resellers and attract further resellers their profit margin would have to increase. This would have to come either from an increase in the sales price of the fuel or an increase in customers since the profit margin available to EcoZoom is already small. However any increase in sales price is likely to have an effect on uptake.

Our data shows that customers prefer a range of bag sizes. The 2kg bag was most popular amongst users since it allows them to access the fuel at a lower price point. However those customers that favored the larger bag sizes tend to be more active users of the fuel. The delivery model seemed to have little effect on the bag size bought; it is more dependent on availability of money and usage rates.

We cannot conclude any clear trends linking average customer usage to the different distribution models from the current data we have from the pilot. The pilot data is limited due to the relatively short time period and the limited number of consistent and active customers.
However it shows that the majority of customers are low users and average usage rates of around 0.3 kg per day are what can be expected from active customers. This is much lower than expected and will have a significant impact on the viability of fuel sales to households.

In summary if EcoZoom was to scale the distribution network moving forward we should concentrate on building up a network of static resellers, locating them as close as possible to the highest density of customers. These reseller should be well recognized in the community and could also act as points of information on the stove and fuel products (potentially doubling as agents for signed up new households as well). However we would have to consider increasing the incentives to resellers since profit margins are currently low which would threaten the financial sustainability of the business. In more rural locations or where logistical challenges exist this could be supplemented with a delivery model. This delivery model would be most effective to deliver to customers organized in group setting having a weekly delivery data and allowing customers to order and pay together.
4. Commercial Viability of Pellet Distribution

During the pilot phase of this project, data was gathered on the ease of signing up customers, potential usage rates, cost of reaching those customers and factors that affect their usage. This data feeds into a larger question around the commercial viability of selling pellet fuel to households in Kenya. For the business to be sustainable in the long term, it needs to generate sufficient profit for EcoZoom to justify further investment and continued operations.

There is currently limited local production of pellet fuel in Kenya. For this pilot EcoZoom imported pellets from a supplier in Zambia which was an expensive option. In the long term, to lower the cost of the fuel EcoZoom would have to source pellets from Kenya or start their own production of pellet fuel in Kenya. The latter whilst giving the most control over the supply chain and highest profit margins required a significant investment in setting up a pellet production facility – especially one capable of producing high quality pellets at scale. Before making such as investment, this pilot allowed EcoZoom to get a better grasp of the potential market for the fuel and costs involved to make a more informed decision whether to scale pellet fuel supply and establish a local production facility.

To support this assessment EcoZoom received pro bono support from ENEA consulting in July 2014 to build a business model for the establishment of a pellet production facility in Kenya. This section discuss the recommendations from that model combined with the data collected from the pilot phase of fuel sales.

4.1. Cost to end user for distributing pellets

During the pilot EcoZoom used fuel that was imported into Kenya from Zambia. Due to the high costs of overland transportation and clearing charges the costs of the pellets landed in Kenya was approximately 60 KES/kg. To encourage users to switch to the fuel during the pilot and to also reflect costs that would be realistic for locally sourced pellets they were sold to retailers at approx. 40 KES per kg during the pilot. Hence the grant subsidized the cost of the pellets by approx. 20 KES per kg during the pilot.

Based on research of pellet and briquette manufacturers in Kenya and abroad, we estimate that if we were to source pellets from a local manufacturer in Kenya the lowest price we could get would be approx. 15 KES / kg. If we were to invest in our own production the cost of producing the pellet could be somewhere between 8-12 KES / kg depending on the scale and efficiency of the operation. These are however estimates and further testing and research would need to be done to get a more accurate cost.

In Scenario 1 below we assume that pellets would be purchased locally at a cost of 15 KES / kg. On top of this we have added on additional costs involved in getting the pellet to customers as based on what we incurred during the pilot phase of the project.
Table 21: Scenario 1 – Cost of pellet fuel to the customer assuming local purchase / production and based on pilot costs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>KES/kg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost of pellets</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage cost</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport supplier to warehouse</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport warehouse to vendor</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packaging material</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packaging labour</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branding costs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost to customer</td>
<td>34.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling price (before VAT)</td>
<td>34.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAT</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale price</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Profit Margin</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.37</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As you can see from Table 21 considering all the additional costs on top of the actual cost of the pellet, when selling at 40 KES / kg it is less than the cost of reaching the customer, meaning that we would actually be losing money. The following should be noted about these costs as based on data from the pilot:

- Storage costs are high as we use a professional 3rd party logistics provider for handling our stock to offer the best security and management.
- Costs for packaging and branding material were high due to the small quantities and ad hoc purchasing during the pilot period. If purchases were made in larger quantities it would be possible to negotiate much more favorable rates and purchase direct from manufacturers.
- The issue of Value Added Tax (VAT) is somewhat of a grey area for sustainable fuels and many suppliers of fuels such as briquettes believe they are not subject to this tax. However during import of the pellet fuel into Kenya for this pilot, whilst it was zero rated for import duty, it was subjected to VAT by the government of Kenya hence in the above we are assuming VAT at 16% would be paid on the fuel to be on the side of caution. Paying these taxes is a big challenge for sustainable fuels that are competing against charcoal that is commonly traded informally, hence rarely subject to full taxes.

Whilst the costs incurred during the pilot give us a good indication of what could be achieved when starting the business and operating at a small scale it is felt that costs could be further streamlined if economies of scale were achieved. The below scenario shows the estimated cost in reaching the customer with further optimization of the value chain. In this scenario we assume that EcoZoom can produce the pellets for 12 KES per kg and storage would be on site hence reducing this cost. The branding costs only cover printing on the bag and doesn’t include marketing costs. The packaging material costs could potentially be reduced based on bulk purchases. By increasing the volume of business we would be able to negotiate more favorable rates on delivery and packaging materials. The below scenario also assumes that discussions with the Government of Kenya would clarify that pellet fuel is in fact exempt from VAT (as is the case for other sustainable energy products such as solar and clean cookstoves).
Table 22: Scenario 2 – Cost of pellet fuel to the customer assuming local production and optimized costs in the value chain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>KES/kg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost of pellets</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage cost</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport supplier to local storage</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport warehouse to vendor</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packaging material</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packaging labour</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branding costs</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Costs</td>
<td>25.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Selling price                           | 40     |
| **Profit Margin**                       | **14.25** |

In this optimized scenario where the costs are streamlined and VAT excluded the potential profit margin raises to 14 KES/kg making the business much more viable and attractive. However feedback from the pilot showed that either the sales price would need to decrease or the selling price increase to give more margins to reseller to scale up the distribution network. Any increase in retail price would be challenging at this stage when the product is new in the market and hence it is likely the selling price may need to drop slightly.

This analysis shows that there are many cost variables that affect the profit margin when distributing and selling pellet fuel to households and each one would have to be optimized to make the business viable. However these optimized costs are still assumptions and further testing at scale would have to be done to understand what could realistically be achieved. It should also be noted that reaching this scale would take considerable time and investment as highlighted by our pilot. This analysis does not consider the investment that would be needed to gain a market but just shows the potential profits once that market was gained.

During ENEA’s assignment they compared the two scenarios of local production versus importing pellets based on initial program assumptions. During their analysis they used the Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) as a parameter to compare the total cost of producing one tonne of pellets. This analysis showed that the LCEO for one tonne of pellets produced locally was 287 USD/tonne compared to 467 USD/tonne for one tonne of pellets imported into Kenya, making local production the most economical option in the long term even when considering the upfront investment cost. For local production, the main costs involved are labor and upfront facility investment, whereas for pellet imports the major costs are the cost of the pellets themselves and shipping. However if EcoZoom was to move ahead with local pellet production it is likely that it would have to continue using pellet imports to sustain the market whilst a production facility became operational.

---

6 Refer to final ENEA report for more detailed analysis and list of assumptions
7 The LCOE (Levelized Cost of Energy) is the total cost of producing pellets including both discounted CAPEX and OPEX. All steps from the raw material to the final reseller are then considered within this indicator.
4.2 Cost of Stove Technology

The cost of the gasifier stove for burning pellet fuel should also be considered during the initial stages of building a household market. The cost to EcoZoom for purchasing the Philips gasifier stoves used in this pilot was approximately 100 USD. The amount paid by the end user for the stoves over a 12 month period was approximately 50 USD, with the idea that the lease agreement tied the end user into buying the pellets, allowing the subsidy to be repaid through profits on sales.

If we consider a scenario where a profit margin of 10 KES was available on every 1 kg of pellets, a customer must use 500 kg of pellets before this subsidy is made back. During our pilot an average daily usage rate of 0.35 kg/day was achieved amongst active users when purchasing on a regular basis. Using this usage rate it would take almost 4 years before a customer paid back the subsidy on the stove and EcoZoom began to make a profit on fuel sales.

To overcome this challenge the following factors would need to be considered:
1. Usage rates would have to significantly increase – this would require additional investment and testing of strategies to understand how to achieve this.
2. Users would have to purchase the gasifier stove at full price – this would require an end user financing component to allow the cost to be spread out over several months to make the stove affordable. EcoZoom does not have the capacity and cannot take on the risk of direct end user financing so this would require a scheme through a third party financial provider.

There are cheaper gasifier stoves available on the market, for example natural draft versions that sell for 40-50 USD, however they would not offer the same health benefits of the forced draft gasifier stove, which is an important factor in promoting the switch to pellet fuel.

4.3 Potential from other markets

Institutional markets

Whilst this study has focused on the household market there is a high potential from other markets such as institutions and industrial customers for purchasing pellet fuel. Institutions can use pellet fuel for cooking in a specially designed large-scale gasifier stove. Institutions can cook for large numbers of people every day and as such have a high demand for cooking fuel. We approximate that an institution could use up to 12,000 kg of fuel per year (however this has not been tested and would likely be lower as we found out with our household estimates). Institutions would also be able to order fuel in bulk reducing transportation costs and would require large bags reducing the packaging costs. These factors would reduce the cost to the customer and increase the profit margin available – although it is likely that the institutional market would also purchase at a lower price compared to households. Pellet producers in other countries such as ECS in Zambia and Abellon Energy in Ghana have had more success in these markets compared to the household market.

A potential challenge with the institutional market is the cost savings that they might incur from switching to pellets. Where an institution is using and buying charcoal they are likely to have a high cost for their fuel and a switch to pellet fuel can offer them significant financial savings – as is the case in many parts of Zambia where ECS operate. However in Kenya the
The majority of institutions are either using LPG (over which pellet fuel would not offer a clear advantage) or they are using firewood for cooking tasks such as boiling. In the case of firewood their energy bills are much lower compared to charcoal – in addition many institutions such as schools in Kenya already have energy saving wood stoves. Some schools also have a policy whereby pupils and parents donate firewood to the school, often partially in lieu of school fees. Out of 7 schools we surveyed in Nakuru, all were using firewood with an average spend of KES 9,500 per month. If we are assuming an average usage of 500 - 1,000 kg of pellet per month for an institution, at a wholesale price of 40 KES/kg, this would cost them between 20,000 – 40,000 KES per month. This is significantly more than they currently pay for their fuel and hence limits the financial incentive for them to switch to pellets.

![Figure 34: An institutional stove burning pellet fuel supplied by ECS in Zambia](image)

The cost of an institutional stove capable of burning pellets should also be considered. During this pilot we planned to import a sample of these stoves into Kenya for testing – since none were available in the country. Whilst the stoves themselves cost approx. 500 USD from the manufacturer once you consider shipping and import duties the landed cost in Kenya would be around 875 USD. Whilst this is comparable with the cost of a large institutional wood saving stove it is still a significant investment for an institution. To get the costs down it is likely that a locally sourced stove solution would have to be found. During this pilot we were unable to test out any institutional stoves due to shipping delays and time constraints. However further commercial testing needs to be done with institutions in Kenya to understand potential usage and uptake further.

**Industrial Markets**

There is a large fuel demand from industrial customers in Kenya for operating boilers and other heat powered equipment. Large industrial users of fuel include tea factories, cement factories and other agricultural processing industries. Many of these industries, such as tea factories, are still reliant on firewood, which is often harvested in an unsustainable manner. As such these industries are facing large fuel shortages. Other industries that rely on furnace oil are looking for alternatives that could save them money. Demand for wood fuel in Kenya
(firewood and charcoal) is projected to reach 40 million m$^3$ by the year 2020 against a supply of 27 million m$^3$ – resulting into a large deficit of about 13 million m$^3$\(^8\).

As such there is a large potential and significant interest from these industries to switch to alternative fuels. However there is still a lack of knowledge with potential suppliers and customers as to the cost-benefit analysis of such a fuel switch and there is a need for more information to answer questions such as the following: x Would pellet fuel require a switch in boiler technology and how much would this cost? x How many pellets would an industrial customer need to meet their energy needs? x What would be the cost saving in switching to using pellet fuel?

x What is the benefit of using a biomass pellet over a briquette?

The few large scale briquette producers that exist in Kenya already have industrial customers as their main markets, showing that these industries are willing to make a switch. However the challenge with these markets is that for a customer to commit to switching to pellet fuel it needs a suppliers that can guarantee a quality supply of pellets in large quantities. Anecdotal findings suggest that a large industrial customer could require up to 5 tons of fuel a day. To secure these customers it requires a large scale facility and significant investment in establishing it.

4.4 Analysis on Commercial Viability of Production

During their assignment ENEA built a business model to assess the viability of setting up a pellet production facility in Kenya. This work was completed before we had collected usage data from our household pilots and hence made the following assumptions on the market for fuel sales from such a facility;

x The company would grow household customers from 1000 hhs in year 1 to 2000 hhs in year 3. Average household consumption would be 500 kg per year per household.

x The company would have 20 institutional customers each with an average fuel consumption of 18,000 kg per year.

x The company would secure 1 large commercial customer with an average usage of 60,000 kg of pellets per year.

In addition we built into the model an approximation of the investment cost to set up a medium size production facility, capable of producing around 5 tons of pellets a day, using high quality equipment imported from Europe and including the purchase of vehicles for fuel transportation. The total investment costs for the facility came to approx. 640,000 USD. The model then considered the costs for operating the facility on a yearly basis.

Based on the sales assumptions above, the model showed that the business could breakeven in the fourth year and make a profit of approximately 350,000 USD per year thereafter. Such analysis shows that there is high commercial potential for such a venture although initially based on many assumptions that would need further verification.

---

However if we keep all assumptions the same and consider the household usage rates at the level we experienced in our model of 0.35kg / day this would give a yearly consumption of only 128kg / year, much lower than we had initially assumed. With this consumption it would take 8 years to pay back the initial investment in a facility with a profit of approximately 86,000 USD per year, therefore a much less lucrative business. If you take out the institutional and commercial customers and consider only households at a usage rate of 128 kg / year the business would not be profitable at the investment cost we estimated. To sustain the business on the household market alone would require a high usage rate and a large number of household, both things which we were unable to achieve in our pilot project. For example in the ENEA model the business would become profitable at approx. 1600 HHs when the average usage rate of the household was 400kg per year.

Whilst this business model was built on many assumptions that would need to be further verified and may have used a high cost for equipment and initial production setup, it indicates a couple of key things;

- Customer usage rates have a significant impact on the profitability of a pellet business
- It is difficult to sustain the business of sales to households alone; the business would also require bulk orders in the form of institutional and industrial customers.
- If the business was to consider households alone it would require a large number of households (>1500) and for those households to have high usage rates (>1.1kg/day).
- Both of these things are difficult to achieve and would require significant investment in sales, marketing and awareness.

4.5 Conclusion on Commercial Viability

Our project, piloting the commercial sales of pellet fuel in Western Kenya, has shown that pellets have the potential to save households money and provide a fast and clean cooking alternative through an environmentally sustainable fuel. However the distribution and sale of pellet fuel is faced with significant challenges in establishing itself as a viable and hence commercially sustainable business opportunity;

1. Importing pellet fuel is not commercially viable (as well as having a high carbon footprint). Hence anyone wanting to sell pellet fuel would have to set up a local production facility for any chance of making a profit on fuel sales.
2. Achieving high usage rates is critical for making the household market commercially viable. Observations from our pilot have shown that this is difficult to achieve and a high touch approach would be necessary to push user’s usage rates up, requiring significant investment in awareness creation and staff resources.
3. The viability of the household market also requires a large number of households to commit to switching to pellet fuel for all their cooking needs. This again would take significant investment and time to achieve with pellet fuel being relatively new in the market.
4. The stove technology required for burning pellet fuel efficiently and cleanly is currently too expensive for the majority of household to afford. Financing mechanisms need to be established in order for people to afford the stove. Offering any subsidy on the stove to be repaid through fuel sales is risky and only possible where high usage rates can be achieved.
5. In addition to the high price current stove technology for burning pellet is often unsuited to everyday cooking needs (such as long low heat cooking tasks) and forced draft technologies require high levels of after sales support and maintenance.

6. To make a pellet production facility more viable a company would need to secure institutional and industrial customers in addition to households. However there remain gaps in knowledge to understand the technology requirements and cost benefit analysis for these market segments.

7. To secure such customers requires a producer to be able to guarantee a large volume supply of high quality pellets from the start – presenting the dilemma of ‘go big or nothing’ in terms of a pellet production facility, hence requiring a significant investment cost.

Based on the above, at this stage, EcoZoom is not intending to scale up its sales and distribution of pellet fuel and does not intend to invest in a pellet production facility in Kenya. There is still a high potentially for alternative fuels such as pellets but it requires significant investment to build the market to a stage where it could be viable. As a pre-profit social enterprise EcoZoom is currently not in a position to make this investment without additional financial support or partnership.

The following recommendations, which The Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves may consider supporting, could help to further increase the viability of alternative fuel businesses in Kenya;

x Support to further test business models and approaches to increase the uptake and usage rates of alternative fuels.

x Support to stove manufacturers to further improve usability and reliability aspects of gasifier stove technology as well as opportunities to reduce costs.

x Further assessment of the institutional and industrial fuel markets to understand the technical requirements of fuel switches and the cost benefit of fuel switching.
Greenway Appliances: Marketing to Build out Retail Distribution Channels

Organization Profile

Year Established: 2011

Countries of Operation: India, Mexico

Headquarters: India

Type of organization: For-profit stove designer and manufacturer

Product(s) – Greenway Smart Stove
http://catalog.cleancookstoves.org/stoves/220

Grant type and date of award: Pilot Innovation Fund Round 1, 2013

Organization Overview

Greenway Appliances, formerly Greenway Grameen Infra started out as a stove design and marketing company in India. Greenway aims to be the choice in home energy appliances for rural consumers, creating a category of products that consumers can choose from. Greenway’s products provide a fuel efficient, smoke-reducing, affordable alternative. Today Greenway designs, manufactures and markets two stove models with two additional models in their pipeline. Greenway’s Smart Stove and Jumbo Stove are now the highest selling biomass stoves in India.

Grant Objective

Greenway had spent 12 months developing the Greenway Smart Stove using a human centered design method. They had developed a quality product and early partnerships with distributors, having achieved sales of 18,000 units to customers in the state of Karnataka in India. With about 160 million households in India using biomass to cook, they knew that they would have to ramp up their marketing strategy and diversify their distribution channels to reach even 1% of their potential market. In December 2012 they applied for a Pilot Innovation Fund (PIF) grant to test a new marketing and retailer activation campaign with the theory that with the right marketing support, small retail shops would be a large driver of sales in India. At the time, retailers in the region had seen stoves as a large up front inventory investment with a high risk of losses, and Greenway’s below the line marketing strategy had not been able to convince a large number of retailers to invest. They had planned the following activities to drive these sales:

• Improve existing marketing materials
  – Create higher quality collateral for in-store marketing, posters, banners and fliers
• Add new forms of marketing
  – Create newspaper and television ads
  – Determine best areas to place them
• Hire new manager to oversee the execution
Lessons Learned in Marketing & Distribution: Greenway Appliances

- Analyze the results
  - Determine effectiveness of efforts by comparing sales before and after campaign

**Grant Achievements**

The Pilot Innovation Fund grant was critical to helping Greenway build out its retail sales channel, which had reached 30% of its sales by the end of 2014. It became clear through the sales and consumer surveys that an overall above the line marketing package enhances consumer awareness of the stoves category and directly increases sales. Greenway went on to successfully apply for a Spark Fund grant to scale their operations, incorporating their lessons learned from their PIF to a revision of their marketing strategy during their Spark grant.

Improve existing marketing collateral. Greenway was able to hire a photographer and models for a professional photo-shoot. They selected a female model to promote the product and produced professional branding materials for use with in-store marketing, posters, banners and fliers. Used newly produced branding to create a newspaper advert. Greenway had hoped to advertise on television to promote the aspirational nature of the product. However, the original proposed grant budget had been reduced and television advertising proved to be much more involved than anticipated.

Add new advertising to the marketing mix. Greenway had only included product demonstrations with a flyer to the promotion strategy before the PIF grant. This was largely due to cash constraints and the startup nature of the organization and product. When trying to build out the retail channel, they listened to the potential retailers who said that they would need marketing support behind the product in order to carry it on their shelves. Otherwise they feared that this new category of product would just take up valuable shelf space. Greenway started with newspaper adverts in English and Kannada, running 4 ads over 6 weeks in one district.

Hire new manager to oversee the execution. The retail sales channel was new for Greenway and they hired a capable regional sales manager for to manage the execution of the strategy in all of Karnataka. He analyzed and categorized retail shops in the region and executed newspaper ads in several districts.

Ultimately, Greenway was able to increase their sales by 40,000 units one year after the grant period ended in 2013. Greenway attributes this to the expansion of their marketing strategy to include above the line materials that complement the demonstrations that their sales agents undertook. However, Greenway found it more difficult thank expected to quantify the return on investment of above the line marketing efforts. Overall sales had increased and retailers were taking up the product, but they were not able to determine customer conversion rates. Part of Greenway’s plan under the subsequent Spark Fund included implementation of better systems to track data overall at the retailer level and a large scale brand survey to track perceptions of the product as a result of their marketing efforts.
Lessons Learned

**Detail matters in the marketing message.** Greenway learned that each detail of the visual message was important to brand recognition. They worked with marketing experts to determine details. For example, they found that promoting the stove with young couples in traditional wedding dress signaled that the stove should be a part of a new couple’s house. The stove’s association with weddings also signaled aspiration. Furthermore, materials were translated into the local dialects of the regions and with different cultural attributes helped them reach new markets. Even the product’s packaging was changed for a more aspirational appeal. A set of focused group discussions conducted with users revealed that one of the major reasons why stoves were not considered at par aspirationally with other household appliances was the packaging. The new packaging amended this and has been popular with both customers and retailers. Creating new marketing collateral was a longer process than expected but has enhanced brand development immensely. Though Greenway still had to conduct product demonstrations to educate users on the product and ensure customer satisfaction, they discovered that branding and advertisement activities created awareness of cookstoves as a product category and comfort among potential customers that they were buying from a professional company.

![Image](image_url)

*Figure 1 Greenway tested a variety of cultural attributes with users to test the most compelling and aspirational messages*

**Invest in a professional firm and experience team where possible.** Cash strapped organizations often keep marketing budgets low and hire minimal marketing staff. Greenway was able to hire a marketing manager as a result of this pilot. Capability of manager of huge importance.

Analyze the results. Tracking results at tertiary (consumer sales) level: This is difficult, but we must invest in organized reporting systems to track sales at individual retail-level One bad link in sales channel can skew results;
Mangalore. Tracking results at secondary (retailer orders) level: retailers greatly affected, even promise of newspaper ad prompted more inventory purchases.

**Tracking results of above the line marketing is challenging.** Greenway noticed an increase in overall sales and retail channel sales, but they had no real insight on the role their advertisements played in driving the channel sale. The adverts directed customers to a retailer and it was difficult to follow up with each retailer on how many customers had mentioned the ad. Greenway ended up conducting separate brand awareness surveys during the course of their Spark grant in order to understand the true customer perception and brand awareness.
Sustainable Green Fuel Enterprise- Testing a hub and spoke fuel distribution model

Organization Profile

Year Established: 2008
Country: Cambodia
Value chain area of focus: Fuel Manufacturer
Product: Carbonized briquettes [http://catalog.cleancookstoves.org/fuels/3]
Grant: Pilot Innovation Fund (PIF) Grantee- Round II

Organizational Overview

Sustainable Green Fuel Enterprise (SGFE) is a private limited company that manufactures char-briquettes made of organic biomass waste as an alternative to wood charcoal and offers a clean energy solution to Cambodia’s cooking fuel consumption and utilization. Char-briquettes are produced with 100% recycled biomass waste and through reduced deforestation, improved job creation and home cooking conditions, it offers environmental, economic and health benefits. GERES (Group for Environment, Renewable Energy and Solidarity) established SGFE as a grant funded program in Cambodia in 2008 and opened its first factory in 2009. SGFE faced the risk of closure when NGO funding ran out in 2011 and it was then that Carlo Figa Talamanca who is the current owner and CEO of the company stepped in to take over operations. Prior to receiving assistance from the Pilot Innovation Fund (PIF) in February 2013, SGFE operated as a true start-up company, with production of 20 tons of char-briquettes a month with a customer base 200 households and small businesses.

Grant Objective:

By the time SGFE applied for the Pilot Innovation Fund, they were nearing a breakeven point financially due to an increase in sales and decrease in expenses and overhead. However, SGFE’s reach was limited and they were not able to keep up with demand for their fuel. SGFE’s grant objectives were to test and improved hub and spoke distribution model, increasing the total number of distributors. In order to effectively test this model and achieve the goal of expanded distribution, SGFE used PIF funding to expand production capacity. While production took up a lot of the PIF budget, distribution was recognized as critical given that char-briquettes are used on a daily basis and need frequent replacement. SGFE was producing, stocking and distributing inventory from their factory to retail locations and restaurants across Phnom Penh:
SGFE had planned to create two distribution centers that would allow for expanded distribution to even more retailers:

Their project plan involved two major work streams that would first create the increased production capacity

Production

1. Increase of production capacity and new storage space
2. Purchase and installation of machinery for a second production line
3. Construction of a new storage space at the factory for raw materials and finished products
Distribution

4. Opening 2 new distribution centers in Phnom Penh
5. A new distribution center to be established in addition to the factory that will continue to serve as a distribution center as well. The innovation here is that the distribution centers will sell to both small distributors/wholesalers as well as directly to end-users at a retail level.
6. Provide transport and delivery services to customers on demand
7. Opening a new distribution center in Sihanoukville
8. This distribution center would be managed separately from SGFE and run by a local entrepreneur who mainly services restaurants
9. Marketing and Communication Campaign to increase sales, including radio advertising and the provision of marketing and communication material such as t-shirts, flyers, billboards and umbrellas for the distribution centers

Achievements of the Grant

The PIF grant period was intentioned to offer proof of concept while targeting both distribution and production objectives. Having identified distribution as a bottleneck to scaling up, PIF funds were set aside to test a hub and spoke, decentralized distribution model- testing two models: an independently owned and operated hub that would play a major role in marketing and transporting the product to customers and bringing on two additional distribution partners that would sell to smaller retailers and restaurants. The arrangement with the independently owned and operated distribution partner did not work and SGFE took the fund allocations in a different direction and instead focused on increasing production. During the PIF grant period SGFE proceeded to double its production from 20 to 40 tons of char-briquettes a month while increasing its customer base to 500 households, serving as strong evidence of the success of the Pilot Innovation Fund. SGFE’s strong growth trajectory made it a recipient of the Spark Grant in 2014 which helped to continue its expansion through investments in improved sales, supply chain and distribution management systems. The company has a current production capacity of 145 tons, selling approximately 60 tons per month to over 500 direct customers or distribution points in a span of 3 years.

During the grant period, several successes on the production and distribution front were achieved.

Production: Given the short grant period, in the first two months SGFE focused on the purchase and installation of its production equipment and the construction of a new storage space. In line with the production goals, SGFE purchased and installed an extruding machine for an additional production line and locally constructed a drying machine. To smoothen the production flow, they bought technical tools for the operation and maintenance of the new machines, new trolleys for raw materials and finished products. In addition to the original proposal, SGFE bought a new mixing machine as a precautionary measure to reduce production halts in case of failure or maintenance delays of its only mixer.
**Distribution**: Four new distribution centers were opened in Phnom Penh, Shanoukeville, Takeo and Svay Reang exceeding the proposed objective of two centers. The advertising and communication efforts accompanying the new distribution model were altered and radio advertising was dropped in addition to scaling down of expenditure on promotional marketing material.

**Lessons Learned**

**Production**

**Stabilizing Stock**: During the PIF period, SGFE prioritized efforts to stabilize stocks and focus on push rather than pull factors to assess production levels. With the help of two intern engineers, SGFE streamlined its production flow and stock management processes to ensure that stocks are maintained at between 50 to 100 percent of the monthly sales demand. Inventory and stock management is applied to both the final product and raw materials. This is a major breakthrough since SGFE did not previously collect stock information nor use it to inform production decisions.

**Leverage Negotiating Power**: Since SGFE has doubled its production; it has leveraged its position to negotiate better prices with its raw material suppliers. SGFE is able to be selective about the suppliers it chooses based on best prices. SGFE conducts random raw material sample inspections to ensure that quality standards are maintained. With the rising production levels, SGFE has been successful in reducing the cost price of inputs.

**Trial and Error**: Carlo Figa is ebullient when he describes SGFE’s success in locally building a dryer that has reduced drying time from 29 to 24 hours. The locally adapted dryer is a result of a trial and error method and SGFE has learned valuable lessons from its compounded experience over the years. Building on the PIF experience, SGFE went on to significantly reduce drying time to 10 hours with the Spark Fund. Another example of this is the enhanced extruder that SGFE currently uses. Over the years, SGFE has learned that fortifying the extruder coil with extra metal and daily cleaning of the equipment adds momentously to its life.

**Production Targets and Incentives**: SGFE introduced an incentive system of employee bonuses to motivate the SGFE team to achieve the big production targets outlined during the PIF grant period. Employees get a bonus when a production target is achieved; this incentive system continues to motivate and uphold employee morale and satisfaction.

**Distribution**

One of the distribution objectives outlined in the PIF proposal was to expand the number of distribution centers across Cambodia to increase the sales of SGFE char-briquettes. While the PIF grant period saw a rise in the number of distributors, this expansion proved unsustainable as SGFE discontinued its relationship with a number of these distributors. However, this proved to be a strong learning experience that has since strengthened SGFE’s distribution strategy.

**Entrepreneurial Distributors**: As some distribution partnerships fell through, SGFE learned that the best distributors are those with strong entrepreneurial traits. Carlo Figa describes XX, a smart, young Cambodian woman as one of as one of SGFE’s best distributors because she
displays drive and is pioneering. Entrepreneurs with access to storage space and a means of transportation have been the most successful distributors.

**Transportation:** The initial proposal had envisioned the purchase of a truck and tuk tuk but SGFE has found that transferring transportation costs to buyers is more beneficial. Individuals or centers that own a means of transportation serve as good distributors. Further, due to the reduced costs of transportation in urban areas, city based distributors have proven to be better distribution agents.

**Price Differentiation:** During the PIF period, SGFE introduced three price levels based on the tonnage size of the purchase. The lowest prices are offered to those who buy directly from the SGFE factory. Individuals who buy less than ten 30-kilogram bags pay the highest price. This price differentiation has been successful in driving sales of char-briquettes.

**Growing Market:** The SGFE proposal expressed fears that a saturated market near its factory would reduce sales in those areas. A majority of the points of sales (POS) for SGFE’s char-briquettes fall within a radius of 5-6 kilometers of the factory. Sales and distribution during the PIF period has revealed that those high POS density areas in fact display growing demand and far from being saturated.

**Effective Marketing Strategy:** SGFE had initially outlined expenditure on promotional material such as Tshirts, flyers, billboards, umbrellas and radio advertising. However, in the course of the grant period they found that providing samples of char-briquettes was in fact one of the most effective ways to drive sales. The sample size, which started off as a 5 to 10 kilogram bag, is now a 30-kilogram bag and would last a night or several nights depending on the amount of usage. In order to set off any expectation of continued giveaways, SGFE is emphatic about the samples being a one-time exchange.